Four Hundred Stanzas on the Yogic Deeds of Bodhisattvas (catuhsataka sastra karika nama) Aryadeva – 4

Four Hundred Stanzas on the Yogic Deeds of Bodhisattvas (catuhsataka sastra karika nama) Aryadeva – 4

L2: [Chapter 13 – Refuting Truly Existent Sense Organs and Objects – Refuting direct objective perception of an external reality independent of the mind and karma. Everyting is like an illusion. – P.251]
L3: [I. Extensively explaining the reasoning that refutes true existence]
L4: [A. Refuting true existence of that which is apprehended: the sense objects]
L5: [1. General refutation]
L6: [a. Actual meaning]
L7: [(1) Refuting that a sense consciousness directly perceives a pot existing by way of its own character]
\ 301.
\ When seeing its form, one does not in fact
\ See the whole pot. Who that knows
\ Reality would claim that the pot
L7: [(2) Applying this reasoning to other instances]
\ 302.
\ By means of this very analysis
\ Those with superior intelligence
\ Should refute individuality
\ All that is fragrant, sweet and soft.
L7: [(3) Absurdity of positing that other parts are seen because visible form existent by way of its own character is seen]
\ 303.
\ If because the form is seen
\ Everything is seen,
\ Why because of what is not seen
\ Would the form not be unseen?
L7: [(4) Refuting direct perception of just visible form existent by way of its own character]
\ 304.
\ There is no direct perception
\ of just the form alone,
\ Because it has a close and distant
\ As well as a central part.
L7: [(5) Showing that the proof and what is to be proved are alike]
\ 305.
\ This also applies when one examines
\ Whether particles have parts or not.
\ Thus to prove a thesis by that
\ Which must be proved is not feasible.
L7: [(6) Showing other lines of reasoning]
\ 306.
\ Thus even a spoken syllable
\ Does not have existence here.
L5: [2. Individual refutations]
L6: [a. Refuting that sense organs apprehend objects existing by way of their own entity]
L7: [(1) Refuting truly existent visible objects]
L8: [(a) Refuting objects]
L9: [1: Refuting our own sectarians’ contentions]
L9: [a: Refutation by examining whether the color and shape constituting a visible form existing by way of its own character taken as object of apprehension by a visual consciousness are inherently one or different]
\ 307.
\ If a shape is distinct from color
\ How is shape apprehended?
\ If not distinct, why would the body
\ Not also apprehend color?
L9: [b: Refutation through the consequence that because the elements are present, a visual consciousness taking a visible form as its object would apprehend both]
\ 308.
\ Only the form is visible
\ But the form’s causes are not seen.
\ If indeed it is thus,
\ Why are both not also
\ Perceived by just the eyes?
L9: [c: Showing what invalidates this contention]
\ 309.
\ Earth is seen as firm and stable
\ And is apprehended by the body.
\ Only that which is tangible
\ Is referred to as earth.
L9: [2: Refuting contentions of other sectarians]
\ 310.
\ Since it was produced as something visible,
\ It is of no use at all to the pot.
\ As with the production of visibility,
\ It lacks even the entity of existence.
L8: [(b) Refuting that which perceives objects]
L9: [1: Refuting that the eye is by way of its own entity an instrument of looking at form]
\ 311.
\ The eye, like the ear, is an outcome of
\ The elements. The eyes see while the others do not.
\ Certainly therefore the Subduer said
\ The fruition of actions is inconceivable.
L9: [2: Refuting consciousness as agent]
\ 312.
\ Because the conditions are incomplete
\ There is no awareness before looking,
\ While afterwards awareness is of no use.
\ The instrument is of no use in the third case.
L9: [3: Refuting the eye as agent]
L9: [a: Absurdity if the eye travels to look at visible form]
\ 313.
\ If the eye travels, that which is
\ Distant would take long to see.
\ Why are extremely close
\ And very distant forms not clear?
L9: [b: Purposelessness if it travels to look at the form after it is seen]
\ 314.
\ If the eye travels when the form is seen
\ Its movement is of no benefit.
\ Alternatively it is false to say
\ What it intends to view is ascertained.
L9: [c: Consequence that all objects would be seen if the eye by way of its own entity perceived form without traveling]
\ 315.
\ If the eye perceives without traveling
\ It would see all these phenomena.
\ For that which does not travel there is
\ Neither distance not obscuration.
L9: [4: Consequence that the eye is an instrument of looking in relation to the eye]
\ 316.
\ If the nature of all things
\ First appears in themselves,
\ Why would the eye not
\ Be perceived by the eye itself?
L9: [5: Refuting a combination of three factors as the instrument of looking at visible form]
\ 317.
\ The eye does not have consciousness
\ And consciousness lacks that which looks.
\ If form has neither of these,
\ How can they see form?
L7: [(2) Refuting truly existent auditory objects]
L8: [(a) Refutation by examining whether sound is a maker of noise]
\ 318.
\ If sound makes a noise as it travels
\ Why should it not be a speaker?
\ Yet if it travels noiselessly, how could
\ Awareness arise in relation to it?
L8: [(b) Refutation by examining whether or not sound is apprehended through contact]
\ 319.
\ If sound is apprehended through contact,
\ What apprehends the beginning of sound?
\ If sound does not come alone,
\ How can it be apprehended in isolation?
L8: [(c) Showing the flaws of this contention]
\ 320.
\ While sound is not heard, it is not sound.
\ It is impossible
\ For that which is not sound
\ Finally to turn into sound.
L6: [b. Refuting apprehension by mental consciousness]
\ 321.
\ Without the sense organs what will mind
\ Do after it has gone?
\ If it were so, why would that which lives
\ Not always be without mind?
L4: [B. Refuting true existence of that which perceives objects]
L5: [1. Defining the aggregate of recognition]
\ 322.
\ An object already seen
\ Is perceived by mind like a mirage.
\ That which posits all phenomena
\ Is called the aggregate of recognition.
L5: [2. Refuting it true existence]
\ 323.
\ In dependence upon the eye and form
\ Mind arises like an illusion.
\ It is not reasonable to call
\ Illusory that which has existence.
L4: [C. Showing that lack of true existence is, like magic, a cause for amazement]
\ 324.
\ When there is nothing on earth
\ That does not amaze the wise,
\ Why think cognition by the senses
\ And suchlike are amazing.
L3: [II. Showing that emptiness of true existence is like magical illusions and so forth]
\ 325.
\ The firebrand’s ring are magical creations,
\ Dreams, illusions, and the moon in water,
\ Mists, echoes, mirages, clouds
\ And worldly existence are alike.
L3: [The summarizing stanza:]
\ Thus in the illusory city of the three false worlds
\ Manipulated by the puppeteer of karmic action
\ The smell-eater maiden performs her illusory dance.
\ Amazing that desire should chase a mirage!
\ This is the thirteenth chapter from the Four Hundred on the Yogic Deeds, showing how to meditate on the refutation of sense organs and objects.

L2: [Chapter 14 – Refuting Extreme Conceptions [of inherent existence and complete non-existence …] – The perfection of wisdom: non-duality of dependent origination and emptiness – P.265]
L3: [I. Proving that functional things are empty of inherent existence]
L4: [A. Brief exposition]
\ 326.
L4: [B. Extensive explanation]
L5: [1. Refuting a truly existent composite by examining the four possibilities [same, different, one owning the other or vice versa]]
L6: [a. Exposition]
\ 327.
\ “The form is a pot” — they are not one.
\ The pot that has form is not separate.
\ The pot does not have form,
\ Not does the form have a pot.
L6: [b. Explanation]
L7: [(1) Refuting other sectarians]
L8: [(a) Refuting the characteristics]
L9: [1: Refuting the substantial entity as basis for a distinct generality]
\ 328.
\ Since the two are seen to have dissimilar
\ Characteristics, if the pot is separate
\ From existence, why would existence
\ Not also be separate from the pot?
L9: [2: Refuting it as a basis for distinct attributes]
L9: [a: Actual meaning]
\ 329.
\ If one is not accepted as the pot
\ The pot is not one.
\ Moreover possession is not reciprocal,
\ Therefore also it is not one.
L9: [b: Inconsistency with the assertion that one attribute cannot rely on another attribute]
\ 330.
\ If the form is the size of the substance,
\ Why is the form not large?
\ If the opponent were not different
\ Scriptural sources could be cited.
L8: [(b) Refuting that which is characterized]
\ 331.
\ Such a thing has no existence
\ As something different from number and so forth.
L7: [(2) Refuting our own sectarians]
L8: [(a) Extensively refuting the composite as a truly existent single unit]
L9: [1: Refutation by examining for oneness or difference]
\ 332.
\ Because the pot is not separate
\ From its characteristics, it is not one.
\ If there is not a pot for each,
\ Plurality is not feasible.
L9: [2: Refuting the composite as a truly existent single unit through the coming together of its constituents]
L9: [a: Actual refutation]
\ 333.
\ The tangible and the intangible
\ Cannot be said to coalesce.
\ Thus it is in no way feasible
\ For these forms to coalesce.
L9: [b: Refuting the rejoinder]
\ 334.
\ Form is a component of the pot
\ And thus, for a start, is not the pot.
L9: [3: Showing other reasoning which refutes the composite as a truly existent single unit]
L9: [a: Consequence that everything is a pot if the pot has true existence]
\ 335.
\ If the definition of form
\ Applies without incongruity
\ To all forms, for what reason
\ Is one a pot and not all others?
L9: [b: Consequence that the eight substantial particles of the pot are one]
\ 336.
\ If you assert that form is distinct from
\ Taste and so forth but not from the pot,
\ How can that which does not exist
\ Without these not be distinct from form?
L9: [4: Refuting truly existent production of the pot from its causes]
\ 337.
\ The pot has no causes
\ And is itself not an effect.
\ Thus there is no pot at all
\ Apart from form and so forth.
L9: [5: Refuting truly existent production by virtue of dependence on parts]
\ 338.
\ If the pot exists by virtue of its causes
\ And those causes by virtue of others,
\ How can that which does not exist
\ By virtue of itself produce something disparate?
L8: [(b) Briefly refuting that though there are many components, the composite is a truly existent single unit]
\ 339.
\ Though they meet and come together
\ Form cannot be smell.
\ Therefore like the pot
\ The composite cannot be one.
L5: [2. Refuting truly existent components]
L6: [a. Just as a composite does not exist truly apart from visible form, smell and so forth, there are no truly existent elemental derivatives that do not rely on the elements]
\ 340.
\ Just as the pot does not exist
\ Apart from form and so forth,
\ Likewise form does not exist
\ Apart from air and so forth.
L6: [b. Refuting truly existent elements]
\ 341.
\ That which is hot is fire but how
\ Can that burn which is not hot?
\ Thus so-called fuel does not exist,
\ And without it fire too does not.
L6: [c. Refuting the rejoinder]
\ 342.
\ Even if it is hot only when
\ Overpowered, why is it not fire?
\ Yet if not hot, to say fire contains
\ Something else is not plausible.
L6: [d. Refuting a fire particle as truly existent fire]
\ 343.
\ If the particle has no fuel
\ Fire without fuel exists.
\ If even it has fuel, a single-natured
\ Particle does not exist.
L5: [3. Refutation by examining for singleness or plurality]
L6: [a. Refuting truly existent functional phenomena through the reason of being neither one nor many]
\ 344.
\ When different things are examined
\ None of them have singleness.
\ Because there is no singleness
\ There is no plurality either.
L6: [b. This fallacy equally applies to other sectarians]
\ 345.
\ Though they assert that where there are none
\ Of those things there is singleness,
\ Singleness does not exist
\ Since everything is threefold.
L5: [4. Applying reasoning which negates the four possibilities in [all] other cases [, with any duality.]]
\ 346.
L3: [II. Showing the cause for mistaking functional things as permanent and truly existent]
\ 347.
\ When the continuum is misapprehended,
\ Things are said to be permanent.
\ Similarly when composites are
\ Misapprehended, things are said to exist.
L3: [III. Briefly showing the reasoning that establishes absence of true existence]
\ 348.
L3: [IV. Showing the need to understand absence of true existence]
L4: [A. Inherently existent dependent arising is not seen by the Exalted]
\ 349.
\ Things do not assemble
\ Unless there is an effect.
\ Aggregation for an effect
\ Is not included for the Exalted.
L4: [B. Release from worldly existence is gained through understanding emptiness]
\ 350.
L3: [The summarizing stanza:]
\ All who have gained a free and fortunate human body,
\ Following the reasoning of Nagarjuna and his son,
\ Who would not make an effort to achieve this end?
\ This is the fourteenth chapter from the Four Hundred on the Yogic Deeds, showing how to meditate on the refutation of extreme conceptions.

L2: [Chapter 15 – Refuting Truly Existent Characteristics [of products] – Production / origination, duration, cessation – P.277]
L3: [I. Extensively establishing dependent arising which are not inherently produced as existing in the manner of a magicians’s illusions]
L4: [A. Specific refutation of inherent production]
L5: [1. Extensive explanation]
L6: [a. Refutation by examining whether that which exists or does not exist is produced]
L7: [(1) Reason refuting production of that which exists or does not exist]
\ 351.
\ How can the non-existent be produced,
\ If what does not exist at the last is produced?
\ How can that which exists be produced,
\ If what exists from the outset is produced?
L7: [(2) Establishing its mode [of operation]]
\ 352.
\ Since the effect destroys the cause,
\ That which does not exist will not be produced.
\ Nor will that which exists be produced
\ Since what is established needs no establisher.
L7: [(3) Refutation by examining the time of production]
\ 353.
\ There is no production at that time,
\ Nor is there production at another.
\ If not produced at that time nor another,
\ When will there ever be production?
L7: [(4) Refutation by examining the thing itself and another thing]
\ 354.
\ Just as there is no production
\ Of that as the thing it is,
\ Neither is it produced
\ As something else.
L6: [b. Refutation by examining the beginning, middle and end]
\ 355.
\ The first, intermediate and last
\ Are not possible prior to production.
\ How can each begin
\ Without the other two?
L6: [c. Refutation by examining both self and other]
\ 356.
\ The thing itself does not occur
\ Without other things.
\ Thus there is no coming into existence
\ Either from self or from other.
L6: [d. Refutation by examining sequentiality and simultaneity]
L7: [(1) Actual meaning]
\ 357.
\ It cannot be said to exist
\ Before, after or simultaneously.
\ Therefore production does not occur
\ Simultaneously with the pot.
L7: [(2) Refuting proof of inherent production]
\ 358.
\ That which was previously produced
\ Was not old when first produced.
\ Also that which afterwards has been
\ Constantly produced is not old.
L6: [e. Refutation by examining the three times]
\ 359.
\ A present thing does not
\ Come into existence from itself,
\ Not come into existence from the future,
\ And also not from the past.
L5: [2. Summarized meaning: showing the effects of refuting production]
\ 360.
\ There is NO COMING of the produced,
\ Likewise NO GOING of that which has ceased.
\ Since it is thus, why should existence
\ Not be like a magician’s illusions?
L4: [B. General refutation of inherently existent production, duration and disintegration]
L5: [1. Refutation of inherently existent characteristics by examining sequentiality and simultaneity]
\ 361.
\ DO NOT OCCUR simultaneously.
\ If they are not consecutive either,
\ When can they ever occur?
L5: [2. Refutation through the consequence of infinite regress of the characteristics]
\ 362.
\ If for production and all the others,
\ All of these occurred again,
\ Disintegration would seem like production
\ And duration like disintegration.
L5: [3. Refutation by examining whether they are one or different]
\ 363.
\ If that which is characterized is said to be
\ Different from its characteristics,
\ How can the characterized be impermanent?
\ Alternatively, existence of all four is unclear.
L5: [4. Refutation by examining whether they are existent or non-existent by way of their own entity]
L6: [a. Refuting that production is truly existent because there are truly existent producing causes]
\ 364.
\ A thing is not produced from a thing
\ Nor is a thing produced from a non-thing.
\ A non-thing is not produced from a non-thing
\ Nor is a non-thing produced from a thing.
L6: [b. Production and so forth are neither truly existent things nor non-things]
\ 365.
\ A thing does not become a thing,
\ Nor does a non-thing become a thing.
\ A non-thing does not become a non-thing,
\ Nor does a thing become a non-thing.
L4: [C. Refuting that what is in the process of being produced is being produced inherently]
L5: [1. Brief explanation]
\ 366.
\ A thing in the process of production
\ Since half-produced, is not being produced.
\ Alternatively it follows that everything
\ Is in the process of being produced.
L5: [2. Extensive explanation]
L6: [a. Refutation by examining that which is in the process of being produced]
\ 367.
\ That which has the nature of presently being produced
\ Is not in the process of production,
\ Nor is that in the process of production
\ Which lacks the nature of presently being produced.
L6: [b. Refuting the assertion that a thing existing between past and future is that which is in the process of being produced]
\ 368.
\ For anyone to whom the two are
\ Impossible without an intermediate,
\ There is nothing in the process of production,
\ For it too would have an intermediate.
L6: [c. Refuting the assertion that a thing before it is produced is what is in the process of being produced]
\ 369.
\ Since the process of production is the arising
\ of the produced through cessation,
\ That which is presently being produced
\ Appears to be a different entity.
\ 370.
\ When a thing is produced there cannot be
\ Anything in the process of production.
\ If the produced is in the process
\ of production, why is it being produced?
L6: [d. Refuting the assertion that the unproduced is what is in the process of being produced]
L7: [(1) Actual meaning]
\ 371.
\ A thing in the process of production is said
\ To be the entirely unproduced arising.
\ Since there is no difference, why should the pot
\ Not be considered as non-existent?
L7: [(2) Refuting the justification]
\ 372.
\ That which is presently being produced,
\ Though incomplete, is other than unproduced.
\ Yet also since other than produced,
\ The unproduced is being produced.
L7: [(3) Necessity of accepting that the unproduced is being produced, if that which is in the process of being produced is produced by way of its own entity]
\ 373.
\ That which is presently being produced,
\ Though not yet existent, is later said to exist.
\ The unproduced is thus being produced —
\ But the non-existent does not arise.
L5: [3. Summarized meaning]
\ 374.
\ The complete is called existent.
\ The uncompleted is called non-existent.
\ When there is nothing in the process of production
\ What is being referred to as such?
L3: [II. Concluding summary of the refutations of inherent existence [of production / origination, duration, cessation]]
\ 375.
\ Since without a cause
\ There is no effect,
L3: [The summarizing stanza:]
\ When they are mere terms and mere imputation,
\ How could non-products be truly existent?
\ This is the fifteenth chapter from the Four Hundred on the Yogic Deeds, showing how to meditate on the refutation of that which constitutes products.

L1: [Section II – B : Showing how to meditate on settling [the procedure between] spiritual guides and students by way of [explaining] the purpose of the chapters and eliminating remaining counter-arguments by misguided opponents.]
L2: [Chapter 16 – Refuting Remaining Counter-Arguments – The dharma door of non-duality and the irrefutability of the Middle Way – P.289]
L3: [I. Briefly explaining the purpose of writing these chapters]
\ 376.
\ For various reasons, that which is empty
\ Appears nonetheless as if not empty.
\ These are refuted individually
\ By all the chapters.
L3: [II. Eliminating remaining counter-arguments raised by misguided opponents]
L4: [A. Refuting reasoning to negate emptiness]
L5: [1. Impossibility of refuting the thesis of emptiness]
L6: [a. Actual meaning]
\ 377.
\ When the author and subject also exist
\ It is incorrect to call them empty.
\ Also with regard to these three, whatever
\ Arises in dependence does not exist.
L6: [b. Refutation by virtue of parity]
\ 378.
\ If through flaws concerning emptiness
\ [Things] were established as not empty,
\ Why would emptiness not be established
\ Through flaws concerning lack of emptiness?
L5: [2. Impossibility of proving the thesis of non-emptiness]
L6: [a. Actual meaning]
\ 379.
\ In refuting the thesis of others
\ And in proving your own thesis,
\ If on the one hand you like to disprove,
\ Why do you not like to prove?
L6: [b. Refuting the justification]
\ 380.
\ When thoroughly investigated,
\ The non-existent is not a thesis.
\ Then all three, such as oneness,
\ Also are not theses.
L5: [3. Refuting other reasoning]
L6: [a. Invalidity of negating emptiness of true existence by reason of direct perception]
\ 381.
\ Where a pot is directly perceptible,
\ The argument of emptiness is meaningless.
\ Here reasons appearing in textual systems
\ Are not [acceptable]; elsewhere they are.
L6: [b. Since emptiness exists, its opposite, true existence, is not feasible]
\ 382.
\ When there is nothing that is not empty,
\ How can emptiness be so?
\ When the one does not exist,
\ Why should the antidote exist?
L4: [B. Refuting adherence to theses which fall into extremes]
L5: [1. Actual refutation – [the dharma door of non-duality]]
L6: [a. Refuting that the non-thesis is a thesis]
\ 383.
\ If there were a thesis, absence of the thesis
\ Would in entity be a thesis,
\ But where there is no thesis
\ What can be the counter-thesis?
L6: [b. Refuting proof that there are truly existent things]
L7: [(1) It is not feasible that there is true existence on the grounds that specific functional things are truly existent]
\ 384.
\ How can fire be hot,
\ When things do not exist?
\ This was refuted above: it was said
\ That even hot fire does not exist.
L7: [(2) Refuting the four extremes by reasoning]
\ 385.
\ If through seeing things one could refute
\ The statement that things do not exist,
\ Who then sees the elimination
\ Of fallacies regarding ALL FOUR THESES.
L7: [(3) Not even the smallest particle of true existence can be observed]
\ 386.
\ When there is nowhere, even in particles,
\ A truly existent entity, how can it occur?
\ Even for Buddhas, it does not exist.
\ Thus it is irrelevant.
L6: [c. Showing that everything is equally free from extremes]
L7: [(1) Actual meaning]
\ 387.
\ If they are not twofold, how can
\ Anything have an existent entity?
\ If that is reasonable to you also,
\ Why raise further arguments?
L7: [(2) Inappropriateness of asserting differentiation of truly existent and not truly existent with regard to any phenomenon]
\ 388.
\ Regarding the non-functional [aspect] of all things,
\ Differentiation are inappropriate.
\ That which is seen in all substantial entities
\ Is not differentiable.
L5: [2. Refuting the justification]
L6: [a. Appropriateness of accepting the thesis of emptiness of true existence]
\ 389.
\ If owing to non-existence you claim
\ No reply is made to the other’s thesis,
\ Why would you not also prove
\ Your own thesis which is refuted by reasons?
L6: [b. Difficulty of finding a thesis refuting emptiness of true existence]
\ 390.
\ Though the world says it is easy
\ To find reasons with which to refute,
\ Why can the errors regarding
\ The others’ thesis not be stated?
L4: [C. Showing parity of reasoning with regard to true existence or lack of true existence]
L5: [1. Both emptiness of true existence and true existence are either equally established or not established merely by words]
\ 391.
\ If just by saying “They exist”
\ Things really did exist,
\ Why should they not also be non-existent
\ Just by saying “They do not exist”?
L5: [2. Mere designation as truly existent will not make it so]
\ 392.
\ If a thing is not non-existent
\ Because the term “existent” is ascribed,
\ Neither is it existent
\ because the term “existent” is applied.
L5: [3. If there were true existence because ordinary people use the verbal convention that things are truly existent, then being conventionally existent they could not exist as their own suchness]
\ 393.
\ If everything is a convention
\ Because expressed by ordinary people,
\ How can anything which exists
\ As [its own] suchness be a convention?
L4: [D. Refuting non-existence as the thesis]
L5: [1. Refuting that negation of truly existent things makes things utterly non-existent]
\ 394.
\ If things are non-existent because
\ Things all do not exist,
\ In that case it is incorrect that all these
\ Concern the non-existence of things.
L5: [2. As there are no truly existent things that which is non-functional cannot be truly existent either]
\ 395.
\ Since a thing does not exist
\ A non-thing cannot exist.
\ Without a thing’s existence,
\ How can a non-thing be established?
L4: [E. Refuting that things are not empty because analogies and reasons to establish emptiness exist]
L5: [1. Showing the invalidity in the form of absurd consequences [of asserting that] there is true existence because there are reasons]
\ 396.
\ If things are not empty because
\ They are empty by virtue of reasons,
\ The thesis would not be distinct from the reasons,
\ And thus the reasons would not exist.
L5: [2. Showing the invalidity in the form of absurd consequences [of asserting that] things are not empty because there are analogies]
\ 397.
\ If things are not empty because
\ There are analogies for emptiness,
\ Can one say, “Just like the crow,
\ So too the self is black”?
L4: [F. Explaining the purpose of teaching emptiness]
\ 398.
\ If things exist inherently
\ What good is it to perceive emptiness?
\ Perception by way of conception binds.
\ This is refuted here.
L4: [G. Showing that conceptions of extremes of existence are erroneous]
\ 399.
\ To say one exists and the other does not
\ Is neither reality nor the conventional.
\ Therefore it cannot be said
\ That this exists but that does not.
L4: [H. Impossibility of refuting through reasoning that which is free from extremes]
\ 400.
L3: [The summarizing stanza:]
\ The sun’s light dispels all darkness.
\ Darkness has no power to destroy the sun’s light.
\ The correct view destroys all extreme conceptions,
\ Banishing any opportunity for controversy.
\ This is the sixteenth chapter from the Four Hundred on the Yogic Deeds, showing how to meditate on settling [the procedure between] spiritual guides and students.

L1: [The Colophon – P.301]
\ This concludes the Treatise of Four Hundred Stanzas on the Yogic Deeds of Bodhisattvas from the mouth of Aryadeva, the spiritual son at the Exalted Naga’s feet. He was born miraculously from the heart of a lotus on the island of Sinhala. Having crossed the ocean of our own and others’ tenets himself, he made the Middle Way most clear by distinguishing between correct and incorrect views.
\ It was translated and [the meaning] settled in the temple of Ratnaguptavihara in the center of the glorious Kasmicri city of Anupamapura by the Indian abbot Suksmajana and the Tibetan translator Ba-tsap Nyi-ma-rak.


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