Four Hundred Stanzas on the Yogic Deeds of Bodhisattvas (catuhsataka sastra karika nama) Aryadeva – 3

L1: [Part II – Explaining the stages of the paths dependent on ultimate truth (accumulation of wisdom)]
L1: [Section II – A : Extensively explaining ultimate truth]
L2: [Chapter 9 – Refuting Permanent Functional Phenomena – Everything is both cause and effect, whole and part, merely imputed by the mind – the Middle Way in causality: no absolute causality / path, no absence of causality – P.203]
L3: [I. Refuting permanent functional phenomena in general]
L4: [A. Actual meaning]
.
\ 201.
\ ALL ARE PRODUCED FOR THEIR EFFECT,
\ THUS NONE ARE PERMANENT.
\ There are no Tathagatas other than
\ Subduers [who know] things as they are.
.
L4: [B. Refuting the rejoinder]
.
\ 202.
\ There is not anywhere anything
\ That ever exists without depending.
\ Thus never is there anywhere
\ Anything that is permanent.
.
L3: [II. Refuting them individually (Self, space, cessations, time, particles, liberation.)]
L4: [A. Refuting a personal self (a permanent cause without being an effect)]
L5: [1. Actual meaning]
.
\ 203.
\ THERE IS NO FUNCTIONAL THING WITHOUT A CAUSE,
\ NOR ANYTHING PERMANENT WHICH HAS A CAUSE.
\ THUS THE ONE WHO KNOWS SUCHNESS SAID WHAT HAS
\ COME ABOUT CAUSELESSLY DOES NOT EXIST.
.
L5: [2. Refuting the rejoinder]
.
\ 204.
\ If the unproduced is permanent
\ Because impermanent [things] are seen to be products,
\ Seeing that the produced exists
\ Would make the permanent non-existent.
.
L4: [B. Refuting three substantial existent uncompounded phenomena]
L5: [1. General refutation]
.
\ 205.
\ That space and so forth are permanent
\ Is a conception of common beings.
\ For the wise they are not objects perceived
\ Even by conventional [valid cognition].
.
L5: [2. Specifically refuting permanent omnipresent space (a permanent thing without being a cause or an effect)]
.
\ 206.
\ A single direction is not present
\ Wherever there is that which has direction.
\ That with directions therefore clearly
\ Also has other directional parts.
.
L4: [C. Refuting permanent time (a primary cause, without being an effect)]
L5: [1. If permanent time is accepted as a cause, it should also be accepted as an effect]
.
\ 207.
\ Since time exists, functional things
\ Are seen to start and stop.
\ It is governed by other factors;
\ Thus it is also an effect.
.
L5: [2. Reason for this]
.
\ 208.
\ Any cause without an effect
\ Has no existence as a cause.
\ Therefore it follows that
\ CAUSES MUST BE EFFECTS.
.
L5: [3. Contradictoriness of that which undergoes change being permanent]
.
\ 209.
\ When a cause undergoes change
\ It becomes the cause of something else.
\ Anything that undergoes change
\ Should not be called permanent.
.
L5: [4. Contradictoriness of that which has come into existence of its own accord depending on causes]
.
\ 210.
\ A thing with a permanent cause is produced
\ By that which has not come into being.
\ Whatever happens by itself
\ Cannot have a cause.
.
L5: [5. Contradictoriness of that which has arisen from something permanent being impermanent]
.
\ 211.
\ How can that which is produced
\ By a permanent thing be impermanent?
\ Never are the two, cause and effect,
\ Seen to have incongruent characteristics.
.
L4: [D. Refuting permanent particles (primary causes, without being effects, or composed of parts)]
L5: [1. Refuting permanent particles]
L6: [a. Unsuitability of that which has parts as a permanent functional thing]
.
\ 212.
\ That of which some sides are causes
\ While other sides are not is thereby
\ Multifarious. How can that
\ Which is multifarious be permanent?
.
L6: [b. Unfeasibility of an accretion which is a separate substantial entity forming through the coalescence of homogeneous particles]
L7: [(1) Actual meaning]
.
\ 213.
\ The cause which is spherical
\ Is not present in the effect.
\ Thus complete interpenetration
\ Of particles is not feasible.
.
L7: [(2) Contradictoriness of asserting that particles do not interpenetrate completely]
.
\ 214.
\ One particle’s position is not
\ Asserted as also that of another.
\ Thus it is not asserted that
\ Cause and effect are the same size.
.
L6: [c. Refuting that particles are partless prior to the formation of a composite]
L7: [(1) Actual meaning]
.
\ 215.
\ Whatever has eastern side
\ Also has an eastern part.
\ Those whose particles have sides admit
\ That they are not [partless] particles.
.
L7: [(2) Contradictoriness of particles forming composites when movement from one position to another is unfeasible for partless particles]
.
\ 216.
\ The front takes up, the back relinquishes —
\ Whatever does not have
\ Both of these [motions]
\ Is not something which moves.
.
L5: [2. Unfeasibility of Yogic awareness perceiving partless particles]
L6: [a. Actual meaning]
.
\ 217.
\ That which does not have a front,
\ Nor any middle,
\ And which does not have a rear,
\ Being invisible, who will see it?
.
L6: [b. Refuting belief in the existence of permanent particles because there are coarse things]
.
\ 218.
\ The effect destroys the cause;
\ Therefore the cause is not permanent.
\ Alternatively, where the cause
\ Exists the effect does not.
.
L5: [3. Why Buddhas do not mention the existence of permanent particles]
.
\ 219.
\ A permanent thing that is obstructive
\ Is not seen anywhere.
\ Therefore Buddhas never say
\ That particles are permanent.
.
L4: [E. Refuting substantially established liberation]
L5: [1. Refuting the substantially established liberation of our own sectarians]
L6: [a. Unfeasibility of substantially established cessation]
.
\ 220.
\ If liberation, which is other than
\ What binds, is bound (i.e. caused) and the means (i.e. causal path) existed,
\ It should not be called liberation(i.e. independent)
\ Since nothing is produced from it.
.
L6: [b. It contradicts the explanation that all suffering is abandoned in the sphere of nirvana]
.
\ 221.
\ In nirvana there are no aggregates
\ And there cannot be a person.
\ What nirvana is there for one
\ Who is not seen in nirvana?
.
L5: [2. Refuting other sectarians’ liberation identified with the self]
L6: [a. Refuting the permanent liberation consisting of consciousness imputed by Samkhyas]
.
\ 222.
\ When free from attachment at [the time of] liberation
\ What good is the existence of consciousness?
\ Also to exist without consciousness
\ Is clearly the same as not existing.
.
L6: [b. Refuting permanent liberation consisting of the potential for the existence of consciousness]
.
\ 223.
\ If at liberation a self existed
\ There could be a seed of consciousness.
\ Without it there is no speculation
\ With regard to worldly existence.
.
L6: [c. Suitability of the complete abandonment of conceptions of a self as liberation]
.
\ 224.
\ It is certain that those liberated
\ From suffering have no other [self].
\ Therefore the end of the self
\ Should always be affirmed as good.
.
L3: [III. Arguing the unsuitability of refuting true existence]
.
\ 225.
\ The conventional is preferable
\ But the ultimate never is.
\ Ordinary people have some [belief in this]
\ But none in the ultimate.
.
L3: [The summarizing stanza:]
.
\ Discovering that external (i.e. world) and internal (i.e. mind) dependently arising Phenomena (i.e. the five aggregates) exist in reliance (i.e. dependently arisen – conventional truths / existence),
\ and understanding Their emptiness of existence (i.e. ultimate truth / non-existence) by way of their own entities,
\ Grow wise in the meaning of THE MIDDLE WAY FREE FROM EXTREMES. (i.e. Tetralemma – Aiming at the Union of The Two Truths)
.
\ This is the ninth chapter from the Four Hundred on the Yogic Deeds, showing how to meditate on the refutation of permanent functional phenomena.
.
.
*******************************************************
*******************************************************
*******************************************************
.

L2: [Chapter 10 – Refuting Misconceptions of the Self – There is nothing permanent that is having rebirths, or is being Liberated – P.215]
L3: [I. Individual refutations of the self]
L4: [A. Refuting the Vaisesika self]
L5: [1. Refuting the nature of the self]
L6: [a. Actual meaning]
.
\ 226.
\ When the inner self is not
\ Female, male or neuter,
\ It is only out of ignorance
\ That you think your own self male.
.
L6: [b. Refuting the rejoinder]
.
\ 227.
\ When all the elements are not
\ Male, female or neuter,
\ How is that which depends on them
\ Male, female or neuter?
.
L6: [c. [Unwanted] conclusion that generating the thought “I” when observing another’s self is reasonable]
.
\ 228.
\ Your self is not my self and thus there is
\ No such self, since it is not ascertained.
\ Does the conception not arise
\ In relation to impermanent things?
.
L5: [2. Refuting the proofs]
L6: [a. Refuting that a permanent self is the cause of entering and leaving cyclic existence]
.
\ 229.
\ From one rebirth to another
\ The person changes like the body.
\ It is illogical for yours to be
\ Separate from the body and permanent.
.
L6: [b. Refuting it as the activator of the body]
L7: [(1) Actual meaning]
.
\ 230.
\ Intangible things do not
\ Produce so-called motility.
\ Thus the life force is not
\ Agent of the body’s movements.
.
L7: [(2) Showing what invalidated [belief in] a permanent self]
.
\ 231.
\ Why [teach] non-violence and wonder about
\ Conditions for a permanent self?
\ A diamond never has to be
\ Protected against woodworm.
.
L6: [c. Refuting proof of a permanent self]
L7: [(1) Seeing memory of past rebirths is unsuitable as proof of a permanent self]
.
\ 232.
\ If your self is permanent
\ Because of remembering other lives,
\ How can your body be impermanent
\ When you see a scar previously formed?
.
L7: [(2) Unfeasibility of mindless matter remembering past rebirths]
.
\ 233.
\ If the self when possessing that
\ Which has mind is a knower,
\ By that [same argument] that which has mind would be
\ Mindless and the person permanent.
.
L7: [(3) Entailment of permanence, if that which has attributes such as intelligence remembers past rebirths]
.
\ 234.
\ A life force which has pleasure and so forth
\ Appears as various as pleasure and so forth.
\ Thus like pleasure it is not
\ Suitable as something permanent.
.
L4: [B. Refuting the self imputed by Samkhyas]
L5: [1. Unacceptability of asserting a permanent conscious person]
.
\ 235.
\ If consciousness is permanent
\ An agent is superfluous.
\ if fire is permanent
\ Fuel is unnecessary.
.
L5: [2. Entailment that [the activity of experiencing] cannot stop until the conscious person, the substance, has disintegrated]
.
\ 236.
\ A substantial entity, unlike an action,
\ Does not alter until it disintegrates.
\ Thus it is improper to claim
\ The person exists but consciousness does not.
.
L5: [3. Unacceptability of asserting that the person’s nature [changes] from actual consciousness first to potential consciousness]
.
\ 237.
\ At times one sees potential consciousness,
\ At others consciousness itself.
\ Because of being like molten iron
\ The person undergoes change.
.
L4: [C. Refuting the self imputed by Naiyayikas]
L5: [1. Refuting that a part of the self possessing a mere particle of mind perceives objects]
.
\ 238.
\ Merely [a small part with] mind is conscious
\ But the person is as vast as space.
\ Therefore it would seem as though
\ Its nature is not to be conscious.
.
L5: [2. Refuting belief in a permanent omnipresent self]
.
\ 239.
\ If the self is in everyone then why
\ Does another not think of this one as “I”?
\ It is unacceptable to say that
\ It is obscured by itself.
.
L4: [D. Explaining other refutation like that of the attributes and so forth]
L5: [1. Asserting that though the principal is matter it is the creator of everything amounts to madness]
.
\ 240.
\ There is no difference between
\ The insane and those from whom
\ The attributes are the creator
\ But are never conscious.
.
L5: [2. Contradiction of asserting that it creates virtue and non-virtue but does not experience their maturation]
.
\ 241.
\ What is more illogical
\ Than that the attributes should always
\ Know how to construct homes and so forth
\ But not know how to experience them?
.
L5: [3. Refuting that a permanent self is the agent of actions and experiencer of their maturation]
.
\ 242.
\ The active is not permanent.
\ The ubiquitous is actionless.
\ The actionless is like the non-existent.
\ Why do you not prefer selflessness?
.
L3: [II. General refutation]
L4: [A. Erroneousness of thinking a personal self exist]
.
\ 243.
\ Some see it as ubiquitous and for some
\ The person is the mere [size of the] body.
\ Some see it as a mere particle.
\ The wise see it as non-existent.
.
L4: [B. Impossibility of liberation from cyclic existence for a permanent self]
.
\ 244.
\ How can what is permanent be harmed,
\ Or the unharmed be liberated?
\ Liberation is irrelevant
\ For one whose self is permanent.
.
L4: [C. Inappropriateness of asserting the existence of a self during liberation]
.
\ 245.
\ If the self exists it is inappropriate
\ To think there is no self
\ And false to claim one attains nirvana
\ Through certain knowledge of reality.
.
L4: [D. Refuting a substantially established liberated [person] without a self]
.
\ 246.
\ If it exists at liberation
\ It should not be non-existent before.
\ It is explained that what is seen
\ Without anything is its nature.
.
L3: [III. Eliminating any fault of annihilation with regard to selflessness]
L4: [A. Although there is no self, there is no danger of the composite and transitory discontinuing]
.
\ 247.
\ If the impermanent discontinues
\ How could there be grass at present?
\ If, indeed, this were true,
\ No one would have ignorance either.
.
L4: [B. Even if a self exists, it is unsuitable as the cause that starts and stops [production]]
.
\ 248.
\ Even if the self exists
\ Form is seen to arise from other [causes],
\ To continue by virtue of others
\ And to disintegrate through others.
.
L4: [C. Producers and that which is produced exist in relation only to impermanent things]
.
\ 249.
\ Just as the sprout which is a product
\ Is produced from a product, the seed,
\ Similarly all that is impermanent
\ Comes from the impermanent.
.
L4: [D. Showing briefly how permanence and annihilation are avoided in terms of the conventional]
.
\ 250.
\ SINCE FUNCTIONAL THINGS ARISE
\ THERE IS NO DISCONTINUATION
\ AND BECAUSE THEY CEASE
\ THERE IS NO PERMANENCE.
.
L3: [The summarizing stanza:]
.
\ Through familiarity with meditating on
\ The impermanence, suffering and uncleanness of cyclic existence,
\ Abandon the limitless views of the self,
\ Both innate and those imputed by tenets.
.
\ This is the tenth chapter from the Four Hundred on the Yogic Deeds, showing how to meditate on refuting the self.
.
.
*******************************************************
*******************************************************
*******************************************************
.

L2: [Chapter 11 – Refuting Truly Existent Time – There is no truly existing absolute time, duration or impermanence – P.227]
L3: [I. Refuting that time is substantially established by nature]
L4: [A. Refuting the past and the future]
L5: [1. Refuting a substantially established future]
L6: [a. Showing the fallacies if the future is truly existent]
.
\ 251.
\ The present pot and the past one
\ Do not exist in the future pot.
\ Since both would be future,
\ The future would not exist.
.
L6: [b. Refuting the rejoinder]
.
\ 252.
\ If a disintegrated thing exists as
\ A future entity in the future,
\ How can what is future in nature
\ Become that which is past?
.
L6: [c. Consequence that it is present if substantially established]
.
\ 253.
\ Because of being future in nature
\ A future functional thing
\ Is thus present
\ And cannot be future.
.
L6: [d. Consequence that impermanence is impossible if all three times are substantially existent]
.
\ 254.
\ If the future, past and present exist,
\ What does not exist?
\ How can there be impermanence
\ For one for whom all times exist?
.
L5: [2. Refuting a substantially established past]
.
\ 255.
\ If it has passed beyond the past
\ Why is it the past?
\ If it has not passed beyond the past
\ Why is it the past?
.
L5: [3. Detailed refutation of the future]
L6: [a. Refuting the assertion of Vaibhasikas and so forth]
L7: [(1) Refutation by examining whether the future is produced or unproduced]
L8: [(a) Actual meaning]
.
\ 256.
\ If the future is produced
\ Why is it not present?
\ If it is unproduced
\ Is the future permanent or what?
.
L8: [(b) Refuting the rejoinder]
.
\ 257.
\ If the future is impermanent because
\ Though not produced it disintegrates,
\ Since the past does not disintegrate
\ Why not consider it permanent?
.
L7: [(2) Consequence that impermanence is impossible if the two times are substantially established]
.
\ 258.
\ If the past and present
\ Are not impermanent,
\ The third which is different
\ From these is also not.
.
L7: [(3) Showing that the existence of future functional things is absurd]
.
\ 259.
\ If a thing which will be produced
\ later exists beforehand,
\ The contention of Niyativadins
\ Is not erroneous.
.
L7: [(4) Consequence that things already produced are produced again]
.
\ 260.
\ To say something which will be made to occur
\ Already exists is unreasonable.
\ If that which exists is produced,
\ What has been produced will arise again.
.
L7: [(5) Refuting that Yogic perception of wished for objects directly perceives future things]
L8: [(a) Actual meaning]
.
\ 261.
\ If future things are seen,
\ Why is the non-existent not seen?
\ For one for whom the future exists
\ There can be no distant [time].
.
L8: [(b) Consequence that fresh restraint from non-virtue and so forth are unnecessary if the future is substantially existent]
.
\ 262.
\ If virtue exists though nothing is done,
\ Resolute restraint is meaningless.
\ If even a little is done
\ The effect cannot exist.
.
L8: [(c) If impermanent it is contradictory for something to exist prior to its production]
.
\ 263.
\ If they are impermanent
\ How can it be said effects exist?
\ That which has a beginning and end
\ is called impermanent in the world.
.
L6: [b. Refuting the assertions of Sautrantikas and so forth]
.
\ 264.
\ Liberation will occur without exertion.
\ For the liberated there is no future,
\ Or otherwise, if this were so,
\ Desire would arise without attachment.
.
L4: [B. Refutation by examining whether the effect exists or not]
.
\ 265.
\ For those who assert effects exist,
\ And for those who assert they do not exist,
\ Adornments like pillars and so forth
\ For a home are purposeless.
.
L4: [C. Refuting a truly existent present]
.
\ 266.
\ The transformation of things also
\ Is not perceived even by the mind.
\ Those who lack wisdom nevertheless
\ Think that the present exists.
.
L3: [II. Refuting the proof [of substantially established time]]
L4: [A. Refuting existence of substantially established functional things as a basis for time]
L5: [1. Refutation by examining whether or not things have duration]
L6: [a. Actual meaning]
.
\ 267.
\ How can there be things with no duration?
\ Being impermanent, how can they endure?
\ If they had duration first,
\ They would not grow old in the end.
.
L6: [b. Proving that duration is not inherently existent]
.
\ 268.
\ Just as a single consciousness
\ Cannot apprehend two objects,
\ Similarly two consciousnesses
\ Cannot apprehend one object.
.
L5: [2. Refutation by examining whether or not time has duration]
.
\ 269.
\ If time has duration
\ Duration is not time.
\ If it has not, without duration
\ There will also be no end.
.
L5: [3. Refutation by examining whether things and impermanence are one or different]
.
\ 270.
\ If impermanence and things are separate
\ Things are not impermanent.
\ If they are one, since things are precisely that which is
\ Impermanent, how can they have duration?
.
L5: [4. Refutation by examining which is stronger, duration or impermanence]
L6: [a. Consequence that subsequent reversal is unfeasible if impermanence is weaker]
.
\ 271.
\ If duration is not weak
\ Because impermanence is weak,
\ Why should a reversal
\ Afterwards be seen?
.
L6: [b. Consequence that nothing will have duration if impermanence is stronger]
.
\ 272.
\ If impermanence is not weaker
\ And is present in all things,
\ None of them will have duration
\ Or nor all are impermanent.
.
L6: [c. Consequence that what was permanent will later be impermanent if duration is stronger]
.
\ 273.
\ If there is always impermanence
\ There cannot always be duration,
\ or else that which was permanent
\ later becomes impermanent.
.
L5: [5. Refuting that both exist together]
.
\ 274.
\ If things have duration
\ And impermanence together,
\ Either it is wrong that things are impermanent,
\ or duration is a fallacy.
.
L4: [B. Refuting proof based on memory of the past]
.
\ 275.
\ Things seen do not reappear,
\ Nor does awareness arise again.
\ Thus memory is in fact deceived
\ With regard to a deceptive object.
.
L3: [The summarizing stanza:]
.
\ Not knowing how to posit continuity and transitoriness,
\ They say time is permanent and the three times exist substantially.
\ Having understood that phenomena are like optical illusions,
\ Learn how the three times are perceived.
.
\ This is the eleventh chapter from the Four Hundred on the Yogic Deeds, showing how to meditate on refuting time.
.
.
*******************************************************
*******************************************************
*******************************************************
.

L2: [Chapter 12 – Refuting Wrong Views – We need a gradual path combining virtuous methods and wisdom. There is no final view to arrive to. — P.239]
L3: [I. Why most ordinary people do not follow this teaching]
L4: [A. Difficulty of finding a listener with the prerequisite qualities]
L5: [1. Prerequisite qualities of the listener]
.
\ 276.
\ An unprejudiced, intelligent and interested
\ Listener is called a vessel.
\ Neither the teacher’s nor the student’s
\ Good qualities will be taken as faults.
.
L5: [2. Disadvantages of not possessing the prerequisite qualities]
.
\ 277.
\ He explained existence and its causes,
\ The means to peace and peace itself.
\ What people do not understand
\ Is seen as the Subduer’s [fault].
.
L5: [3. Eliminating arguments]
L6: [a. Proving the Subduer’s omniscience]
L7: [(1) Appropriateness of being glad about the teaching of emptiness which annihilates suffering and its sources]
.
\ 278.
\ These strange people all agree that by
\ Giving up everything one attains nirvana.
\ For what reason do they dislike
\ That which puts an end to all?
.
L7: [(2) Why there is no liberation in any teaching other than the Teacher’s]
.
\ 279.
\ How will one who does not know
\ The means to give it up, do so?
\ Certainly, therefore, the Subduer said
\ There is no peace in any other [teaching].
.
L7: [(3) Means to gain certainty regarding extremely hidden matters taught by the Teacher]
.
\ 280.
\ Whoever doubts what the Buddha said
\ About that which is hidden
\ Should rely on emptiness
\ And gain conviction in him alone.
.
L6: [b. Showing that others’ teachers are not authentic]
.
\ 281.
\ Those who find it hard to see
\ This world are ignorant of others.
\ Those who follow them will be
\ Misled for a very long time.
.
L4: [B. Difficulty of understanding the meaning of the fundamental mode of existence]
L5: [1. Why emptiness is feared]
L6: [a. Why some, although seeking liberation, follow the Forders]
.
\ 282.
\ The unwise take no delight in letting
\ Their mind follow a guide
\ Who has done that which is
\ Most difficult — attained nirvana.
.
L6: [b. Recognizing a person who fears emptiness]
.
\ 283.
\ When it is not seen, fear does not begin.
\ When seen, it stops completely.
\ Thus one can say with certainty;
\ Those who know a little are afraid.
.
L6: [c. Why childish people fear emptiness]
.
\ 284.
\ Childish beings are certainly only
\ Familiar with that which involves them.
\ Because of unfamiliarity
\ They fear that which extricates them.
.
L5: [2. Faults of impeding others’ understanding of emptiness]
.
\ 285.
\ If someone who is shrouded in
\ Complete ignorance and impedes suchness
\ Will not even attain good fortune,
\ What need to mention liberation?
.
L5: [3. Taking care to lapse from the view of suchness]
.
\ 286.
\ Lapsing from ethics is preferable
\ To lapsing from the view.
\ Through ethics one gains a high rebirth;
\ The supreme state is reached by means of the view.
.
L5: [4. Stages leading towards suchness]
.
\ 287.
\ For the unreceptive, conceptions of a self are best;
\ To teach them selflessness is not.
\ They would go to bad rebirths,
\ While the extraordinary attain peace.
.
L5: [5. Recognizing suchness]
L6: [a. Recognizing the fundamental mode of existence]
.
\ 288.
\ There is no other door to peace,
\ And it destroys wrong views.
\ That which is the object of
\ All Buddhas is called selflessness.
.
L6: [b. Why fear arises in the weak]
.
\ 289.
\ The unreceptive are terrified
\ Just by its very name.
\ What so-called strong man is seen
\ Who does not frighten the weak?
.
L4: [C. The profound is not taught for the sake of argument]
L5: [1. Although not taught for the sake of debate this very teaching burns up wrong contentions]
.
\ 290.
\ This principle is not taught
\ By Tathagatas for the sake of debate,
\ Yet it burns up others’ contentions
\ As fire does its fuel.
.
L5: [2. Why this is so]
L6: [a. Actual meaning]
.
\ 291.
\ Whoever knows this teaching
\ Will not relish others.
\ Thus to me this teaching seems
\ Like the door to destruction.
.
L6: [b. Why the Exalted do not experience fear]
.
\ 292.
\ For those who think there is
\ In reality no self and abide in this thought,
\ How will existence cause pleasure
\ Or non-existence cause fear?
.
L5: [3. Appropriateness of compassion for those following wrong paths]
.
\ 293.
\ Seeing the many Forders
\ Who are seeds of futility,
\ Who would not feel pity
\ For people who long for a teaching?
.
L4: [D. Showing the comparative subtlety and coarseness of our own and others’ teaching]
L5: [1. General explanation of why those of inferior intelligence value others’ teaching but not the Buddha’s]
.
\ 294.
\ The teaching of the Sakyas,
\ Nirgranthas and Brahmins are perceived
\ By the mind, the eyes and the ears.
\ Thus the Subduer’s teaching is subtle.
.
L5: [2. Specific explanation]
L6: [a. Those seeking liberation should not try these systems]
.
\ 295.
\ Brahmin practices are said
\ Mainly to be an outward show.
\ The practices of Nirgranthas
\ Are said to be mainly stultifying.
.
L6: [b. How those of inferior intelligence develop respect]
.
\ 296.
\ Brahmins are revered
\ Because they adopt the orthodox.
\ Nirgranthas are pitied
\ Because they adopt the deluded.
.
L6: [c. Why those systems are not excellent teaching]
.
\ 297.
\ Suffering is a maturation
\ And thus is not virtuous.
\ Similarly, birth too is not virtuous,
\ Being a maturation of actions.
.
L3: [II. Exposition of good explanation in brief]
L4: [A. Actual meaning]
.
\ 298.
\ In brief Tathagatas explain
\ VIRTUE AS NON-VIOLENCE
\ And EMPTINESS AS NIRVANA —
\ Here there are only these two.
.
L4: [B. Why outsiders do not appreciate the Teacher’s doctrine]
.
\ 299.
\ To ordinary people their own position,
\ Like their birthplace, is attractive.
\ Why would you find attractive
\ That which precludes it?
.
L3: [III. Advising those who seek emancipation to adopt good explanations]
.
\ 300.
\ The intelligent who seek what is good
\ Adopt what is worthwhile even from others.
\ Does the sun not belong to all
\ On earth who have sight?
.
L3: [The summarizing stanza:]
.
\ Become a proper vessel for good explanation
\ And learned in the non-inherent existence of dependent arising,
\ The final object of the path that severs worldly existence,
\ The understanding of which frees from attachment to extreme views.
.
\ This is the twelfth chapter from the Four Hundred on the Yogic Deeds, showing how to meditate on refuting views.