The Entrance into the Middle Way (Madhyamakavatara) By Chandrakirti Part 2

\ [VI.101]
\ #144.
\ The nature of those elements that are the objects of your mind
\ Is not the nature of this.
\ How could one who has such thick mental darkness here
\ Correctly realize the world beyond?
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\ [VI.102]
\ #145.
\ You should realize that when you deny the world beyond
\ You are conceptualizing the nature of objects of knowledge with a wrong view
\ Because you have a body that is a basis for developing such a view.
\ It is the same when you assert the nature of the elements to be existent.
.
\ [VI.103]
\ #146.
\ How these elements do not exist has already been explained.
\ How? Because production from self, other, both, and no cause
\ Have already been refuted in general above.
\ Therefore these unmentioned elements also do not exist.
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L8: [PHENOMENA-C. CONCLUSION – The meaning established by the refutation of the four extremes of production — The King of all reasonings]
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\ [VI.104]
\ #147ab.
\ Since production from self, other, both, or without depending upon a cause do not exist,
\ Things are free from inherent existence.
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\ <<< “There is not a single thing which is not dependently arisen; therefore, there is not a single thing that is not empty.” >>>
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L7: [PHENOMENA-2 Rejecting arguments against this refutation]
L8: [Phenomena-2.1 The actual rejection of arguments]
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\ [VI.104]
\ #147cd.
\ Because worldly beings have thick confusion like a mass of cloud,
\ Objects appear incorrectly to them.
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\ [VI.105]
\ #148.
\ Just as some, due to unclear sight, wrongly apprehend floating hairs,
\ Two moons, peacocks’ feathers, flies, and so forth,
\ So too the unwise through the faults of confusion
\ See various produced phenomena with their minds.
.
\ [VI.106]
\ #149.
\ ‘Since actions arise in dependence upon confusion, without confusion they will not arise.’
\ Certainly only the unwise conceptualize this.
\ The wise, who have completely eliminated thick darkness with the sun of their excellent minds,
\ Understand emptiness and are liberated.
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\ [VI.107]
\ #150.
\ ‘If things did not exist in thatness
\ They would not exist even nominally,
\ Like a child of a barren woman;
\ Therefore they must be inherently existent.’
.
\ [VI.108]
\ #151.
\ Whatever are the objects of those with unclear sight and so forth,
\ Such as floating hairs, are not produced.
\ Therefore you should first examine these,
\ And then apply this to the unclear sight of ignorance.
.
\ [VI.109]
\ #152.
\ If a dream, a city of smell-eaters, the water of a mirage,
\ Hallucinations, reflections, and so forth are seen without production,
\ Why for you is that unsuitable there,
\ For it is similarly non-existent?
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\ [VI.110]
\ #153.
\ Thus, although they are not produced in thatness,
\ They are not objects that are unseen by worldly beings,
\ Like a child of a barren woman.
\ Therefore what you assert is not definite.
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L8: [Phenomena-2.2 A summary]
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\ [VI.111]
\ #154.
\ The production from its own side of a child of a barren woman
\ Does not exist either in thatness or for the worldly.
\ In the same way, all these things
\ Have no production by their own entity either in thatness or for the worldly.
.
\ [VI.112]
\ #155.
\ Thus, with respect to this the Blessed One says
\ That from the beginning all phenomena are pacified, free from production,
\ And by nature completely beyond sorrow.
\ Therefore production is always non-existent.
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\ [VI.113]
\ #156.
\ Just as these pots and so forth do not exist in thatness,
\ And yet exist well-known to the worldly,
\ So it is with all things.
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L7: [PHENOMENA-3 How dependently-arising production eliminates wrong conceptions that grasps at extremes]
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\ [VI.114]
\ #157.
\ Because things are not produced without a cause,
\ Not from causes such as Ishvara and so forth,
\ And not from self, other, or both,
\ They are produced completely dependently.
.
\ [VI.115]
\ #158.
\ Because things arise completely dependently,
\ These conceptions [or views] cannot be sustained.
\ Therefore this reasoning of dependent arising
\ Cuts all nets of bad views.
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\ [VI.116]
\ #159.
\ Conceptions arise if things exist;
\ But how things do not exist has already been thoroughly explained.
\ Without things they do not arise,
\ As, for example, without fuel there is no fire.
\
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L7: [PHENOMENA-4 Identifying the result of logical analysis]
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\ [VI.117]
\ #160.
\ Ordinary beings are bound by conceptions,
\ Whereas Yogis without conceptions are liberated.
\ Therefore the wise say that whenever conceptions are eliminated
\ It is the result of correct analysis.
.
\ [VI.118]
\ #161.
\ The analyzes in the treatises were not composed out of attachment to debate;
\ Rather thatness is revealed for the sake of liberation.
\ If in correctly explaining thatness, the works of others are discredited,
\ There is no fault.
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\ [VI.119]
\ #162.
\ Attachment to one’s own view,
\ And likewise anger at the views of others, are mere conceptions.
\ Therefore those who eliminate attachment and anger and analyze correctly
\ Swiftly attain liberation.
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L6: [2.3.5.3.2 ESTABLISHING SELFLESSNESS OF PERSONS BY REASONING]
L7: [PERSON-1 Those who desire liberation must first negate inherently existent self]
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\ [VI.120]
\ #163.
\ Wisdom sees that all delusions and all faults
\ Arise from the view of the transitory collection.
\ Having understood that its object is the self,
\ Yogis negate the self.
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L7: [PERSON-2 The way to negate inherently existent self and mine]
L8: [PERSON-2.1 Negating inherently existent self]
L8: [PERSON-2.1.1 DIFFERENT – Negating a self that is a different entity from the aggregates as fabricated by other — non-Buddhist traditions — nobody really think the self is different than the aggregates]
L9: [PERSON-2.1.1.1 Stating the other system]
L9: [PERSON-2.1.1.1-i Stating the system of the Samkhyas]
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\ [VI.121.ab]
\ #164ab.
\ A self that is an experiencer, a permanent thing, a non-creator,
\ And without qualities or activity is fabricated by the Tirthikas.
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L9: [PERSON-2.1.1.1-ii Stating the system of the Vaisesikas and others]
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\ [VI.121.cd]
\ #164cd.
\ Through finer and finer distinctions,
\ Different traditions of the Tirthikas have evolved.
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L9: [PERSON-2.1.1.2 Refuting this system]
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Madhyamika-Prasangikas
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\ [VI.122]
\ #165.
\ Since such a self is not born, it does not exist,
\ Just like a child of a barren [ / sterile] woman;
\ And since it is not even the basis of grasping at I,
\ It cannot be asserted even conventionally.
.
\ [VI.123]
\ #166.
\ All the characteristics attributed to it by the Tirthikas
\ In this treatise and that treatise
\ Are damaged by the reason of its not being born, with which they are familiar;
\ Therefore none of these characteristics exists.
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\ [VI.124]
\ #167.
\ Thus there is no self that is other than the aggregates
\ Because it is not apprehended separate from the aggregates.
\ It cannot even be asserted as the basis of worldly I-grasping minds,
\ Because though they do not cognize it, they have a view of self.
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\ [VI.125]
\ #168.
\ Even those who have spent many aeons as animals
\ Do not see this unborn permanent;
\ And yet they too are seen to grasp at I.
\ Therefore there is no self that is other than the aggregates.
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L8: [PERSON-2.1.2 SAME – Refuting the assertion fabricated within our own tradition that the aggregates are [the same as] the self –the same of the five aggregates, or the same as only a subset]
L9: [PERSON-2.1.2.1 Showing contradiction in the assertion that the aggregates are L9: [the same as] the self]
L9: [PERSON-2.1.2.1-i The actual meaning]
L9: [PERSON-2.1.2.1-ia Stating the other system]
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\ [VI.126]
\ #169.
\ ‘Since a self that is other than the aggregates is not established,
\ The observed object of the view of self is only the aggregates.’
\ Some assert all five aggregates as the basis of the view of self,
\ And some assert the mind alone.
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L9: [PERSON-2.1.2.1-ib Refuting this system]
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Madhyamika-Prasangikas
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\ [VI.127]
\ #170.
\ If the aggregates are [the same as] the self, then since they are many,
\ The self is also many.
\ The self is a substance,
\ And the view of it is not wrong because it apprehends a substance.
.
\ [VI.128]
\ #171.
\ The self definitely ceases at the time of a nirvana;
\ And in the lives prior to a nirvana,
\ Since an agent who is born and perishes does not exist,
\ There are no results [i.e. karmic consequences], and one experiences what another has accumulated.
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L9: [PERSON-2.1.2.1-ii Refuting a denial of the fault]
\ Lower schools
.
\ [VI.129a]
\ #172a.
\ ‘Since there is a continuum in thatness there is no fault;’
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Madhyamika-Prasangikas
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\ [VI.129bc]
\ #172bc.
\ But the faults of a continuum have already been explained in a previous analysis [verse 104].
\ Therefore neither the aggregates nor the mind is suitable to be the self.
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L9: [PERSON-2.1.2.2 Proving that assertion to be untenable]
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Madhyamika-Prasangikas
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\ [VI.129d]
\ #172d
\ Because the world has no end and so forth.
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L9: [PERSON-2.1.2.3 Showing other contradictions in the assertion that the aggregates are the self]
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Madhyamika-Prasangikas
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\ [VI.130ab]
\ #173ab.
\ According to you, when a Yogi sees selflessness,
\ Things are definitely non-existent.
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Madhyamika-Prasangikas
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\ [VI.130cd]
\ #173cd.
\ If it is a permanent self that is negated, then in that case
\ Neither your mind nor your aggregates is the self.
.
\ [VI.131]
\ #174.
\ According to you, a Yogi seeing selflessness
\ Does not realize the thatness of forms and so forth;
\ And because he observes forms and apprehends,
\ He generates attachment and so forth from not having realized their nature.
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Madhyamika-Prasangikas
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\ [VI.132]
\ #175.
\ If you assert that the aggregates are the self
\ Because the Blessed One says that the aggregates are the self,
\ This is to refute a self other than the aggregates,
\ Because in other Sutras it says that forms are not the self and so forth.
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\ [VI.133]
\ #176.
\ Since other Sutras say that
\ Forms, feelings, and discriminations are not the self,
\ Nor are compositional factors or consciousness,
\ The teaching in the Sutra does not say that the aggregates are the self.
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L9: [PERSON-2.1.2.4-ib Even if it were given from the standpoint of establishment, it still would not reveal that the aggregates are the self — the mere collection]
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Some lower schools
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\ [VI.134ab]
\ #177ab.
\ ‘When it says that the aggregates are the self
\ It means the [mere] collection of the aggregates, not their entities.’
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Madhyamika-Prasangikas
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\ [VI.134cd]
\ #177cd.
\ It is not a protector, subduer, or witness;
\ Since it does not exist, that is not the collection.
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L9: [PERSON-2.1.2.4-ic Rejecting an argument against this — similar to a cart]
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Madhyamika-Prasangikas
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\ [VI.135ab]
\ #178ab.
\ In that case, the collection of its parts remaining is a cart,
\ Because self is similar to a cart.
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L9: [PERSON-2.1.2.4-ii Explaining in dependence upon other Sutras that the mere collection of the aggregates is not the self]
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Madhyamika-Prasangikas
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\ [VI.135cd]
\ #178cd.
\ Sutra says that it is dependent upon the aggregates;
\ Therefore the mere collection of the aggregates is not the self.
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L9: [PERSON-2.1.2.4-iii Refuting that the shape of the arrangement of the mere collection of the aggregates is the self]
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Madhyamika-Prasangikas
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\ [VI.136]
\ #179.
\ If you say it is the [mere physical] shape, then since that belongs to form-possessors,
\ They are the self according to you.
\ The collection of mind and so forth are not the self
\ Because they do not have shape.
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L9: [PERSON-2.1.2.4-iv Showing another contradiction in the assertion that the self is the mere collection of the aggregates — subject & complement cannot be different, nor the same]
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Madhyamika-Prasangikas
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\ [VI.137ab]
\ #180ab.
\ It is impossible for oneself the appropriator and what is appropriated to be identical,
\ Otherwise the agent [subject] and the [object / complement of the] action would be identical.
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Madhyamika-Prasangikas
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\ [VI.137cd]
\ #180cd.
\ If you think there is an [object of an] action without an agent,
\ That is not so because there is no action without an agent.
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L9: [PERSON-2.1.2.4-v Buddha says that the self is imputed upon the six elements and so forth]
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Madhyamika-Prasangikas
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\ [VI.138]
\ #181.
\ Since the Able One teaches that the self is dependent upon
\ The six elements – earth, water, fire, wind,
\ Space, and consciousness –
\ And upon the six bases, eye contact and so forth,
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\ [VI.139]
\ #182.
\ And since he says that it is dependent upon
\ The phenomena of minds and mental factors,
\ It is not them, not any one of them, and not the mere collection;
\ Therefore the I-grasping mind does not observe them.
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L9: [PERSON-2.1.2.5 Showing that the other system is incoherent — they do not have the right object of negation]
\ Samittiyas
.
\ [VI.140a]
\ #183a.
\ ‘When selflessness is realized, a permanent self is negated’;
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Madhyamika-Prasangikas
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\ [VI.140bcd]
\ #183bcd.
\ But this is not held to be the basis of grasping at I.
\ Therefore it is amazing that you say that the view of self
\ Is eradicated through knowing the non-existence of self!
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\ [VI.141]
\ #184.
\ It would be like someone who sees a snake in a hole in the wall of his house
\ Having his anxiety quelled, and losing his fear of the snake
\ By someone saying ‘There is no elephant here!’
\ Alas, he would be the laughing stock of others.
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L8: [PERSON-2.1.3 BOTH – Refuting the three positions of dependent, basis, and possession that remain after these two — An inherently existing thing that is both the same and different is impossible … by definition; it is either the same, or different]
L9: [PERSON-2.1.3.1 Refuting the three position of dependent, basis, and possession]
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\ [VI.142]
\ #185.
\ The self is not within the aggregates,
\ And the aggregates are not within the self.
\ Why not? If they were other, then there would be these conceptualizations;
\ But since they are not other, these are just conceptions.
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\ [VI.143]
\ #186.
\ The self is not said to possess form because the self does not exist;
\ Therefore there is no relationship with the meaning of possession.
\ Whether other, possessing cows, or not other, possessing form,
\ The self is neither one with nor other than form.
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L9: [PERSON-2.1.3.2 A summary of the refutation]
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\ [VI.144]
\ #187.
\ Form is not the self, the self does not possess form,
\ The self is not within form, and form is not within the self.
\ Thus all the aggregates should be known in these four ways,
\ Said to be the twenty views of the self.
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\ [VI.145]
\ #188.
\ The vajra realizing selflessness destroys the mountain of views,
\ And these high peaks in the huge mountain range
\ Of the view of the transitory collection
\ Are destroyed along with the self.
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L8: [PERSON-2.1.4 NEITHER – Negating a substantially existent self that is neither identical nor different — An inherently existing thing that is neither the same nor different is impossible … by definition; it is either the same, or different]
L9: [PERSON-2.1.4.1 Stating the other system]
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\ [VI.146]
\ #189.
\ Some assert a substantially existent person who is indescribable
\ In terms of sameness, otherness, permanence, impermanence, and so forth.
\ They say it is an object of knowledge of the six consciousnesses,
\ And assert that it is the basis of grasping at I.
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L9: [PERSON-2.1.4.2 Refuting this system]
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Madhyamika-Prasangikas
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\ [VI.147]
\ #190.
\ Since you do not assert mind to be indescribable with respect to form,
\ You should not assert existent things to be indescribable.
\ If self exists as a thing,
\ Existent things, like mind, are not indescribable.
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\ [VI.148]
\ #191.
\ According to you a pot, which is an entity not existing as a thing,
\ Is indescribable with respect to form and so forth.
\ Therefore, you should not assert a self indescribable with respect to its aggregates
\ Existing by itself.
.
\ [VI.149]
\ #192.
\ You do not assert that consciousness is other than its own nature,
\ But you do assert it to be a thing that is other than form and so forth.
\ Since these two aspects are seen in things,
\ The self does not exist because it lacks the characteristics of things.
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L8: [PERSON-2.1.5 WHAT IT IS – Explaining with an analogy how the self is merely a dependent imputation
L8: [the Sevenfold Analysis applied to the chariot]
L9: [PERSON-2.1.5.1 Even though the self does not exist in the seven extremes it is a dependent imputation, like a cart / chariot]
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\ [VI.150]
\ #193.
\ Therefore the basis of grasping at I is not a thing.
\ It is not other than the aggregates, and it is not the entity of the aggregates;
\ It does not depend upon the aggregates, and it does not possess them.
\ It exists in dependence upon the aggregates.
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\ [VI.151]
\ #194.
\ It is like a cart, which is not other than its parts,
\ Not non-other, and does not possess them.
\ It is not within its parts, and its parts are not within it.
\ It is not the mere collection, and it is not the shape.
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L9: [PERSON-2.1.5.2 An extensive explanation of the two positions not previously explained]
L9: [PERSON-2.1.5.2-i The actual meaning]
L9: [PERSON-2.1.5.2-ia Refuting the assertion that a cart is the mere collection of its parts]
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Madhyamika-Prasangikas
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\ [VI.152ab]
\ #195ab.
\ If the mere collection is a cart,
\ Then that cart exists in the pieces that remain.
\ Objection
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\ [VI.152cd]
\ #195cd.
\ Without a part-possessor there are no parts,
\ Therefore it is impossible for the mere shape to be the cart.
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L9: [PERSON-2.1.5.2-ib Refuting the assertion that a cart is the mere shape of its parts]
L9: [PERSON-2.1.5.2-ib1 Refuting the assertion that a cart is the shape of its individual parts]
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Madhyamika-Prasangikas
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\ [VI.153]
\ #196.
\ According to you, the shape of each part is the same
\ When assembled into a cart as it was before.
\ Just as with those that were separate,
\ So too there is no cart even now.
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\ [VI.154]
\ #197.
\ If the wheels and so forth have different shapes
\ Now at the time of the cart, they must be visible,
\ But they are not;
\ Therefore the mere shape is not the cart.
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L9: [PERSON-2.1.5.2-ib2 Refuting the assertion that a cart is the shape of the collection of its parts]
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Madhyamika-Prasangikas
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\ [VI.155]
\ #198.
\ Since for you there is not the slightest collection,
\ That shape is not of the collection of parts;
\ And since it does not depend upon anything,
\ How, in this case, can it be the shape?
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L9: [PERSON-2.1.5.2-ii Transferring this reason to others]
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\ [VI.156]
\ #199.
\ You should know that all things are produced
\ Just as you have asserted here,
\ With aspects of effects having untrue natures
\ Arising in dependence upon untrue causes.
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\ [VI.157]
\ #200.
\ Because of this, it is also unsuitable to say that a mind of a pot
\ Observes the forms and so forth that exist like that.
\ Since there is no production, forms and so forth do not exist;
\ Therefore it is also unsuitable that their shape does.
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L9: [PERSON-2.1.5.3 Rejecting an argument against this explanation]
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Madhyamika-Prasangikas
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\ [VI.158]
\ #201.
\ Indeed it is not established by the seven ways,
\ Either in thatness or for the worldly;
\ But from the point of view of the worldly without analysis
\ It is imputed here in dependence upon its parts.
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L9: [PERSON-2.1.5.4 Showing that the nominal meaning of other names is also established]
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Madhyamika-Prasangikas
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\ [VI.159]
\ #202.
\ It is a part-possessor and a component-possessor.
\ For living beings a cart is called an agent,
\ And for beings it exists as a taker.
\ Do not destroy conventionalities known to the world.
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L8: [PERSON-2.1.6 USEFULNESS – This presentation has the good quality of allowing us easily to abandon conceptions grasping at extremes]
L9: [PERSON-2.1.6.1 The actual meaning]
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Madhyamika-Prasangikas
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\ [VI.160]
\ #203.
\ How can it be said that that which is non-existent in the seven ways exists
\ When its existence is not found by Yogis?
\ Since they realize thatness easily,
\ Its existence should be asserted in the same way here.
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L9: [PERSON-2.1.6.2 Rejecting an argument against this]
\ Objection How can you say that the parts of a cart do not exist inherently when everyone can clearly see the wheels and so forth?
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Madhyamika-Prasangikas
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\ [VI.161]
\ #204.
\ If a cart does not exist, then in that case
\ Since there is no part-possessor its parts also do not exist.
\ For example, if a cart is burned its parts no longer exist.
\ Likewise when the part-possessor is consumed by the fire of wisdom, so too are the parts.
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L9: [PERSON-2.1.6.3 Applying the analogy of the cart to the meaning of the nominal self]
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\ [VI.162]
\ #205.
\ In the same way, the self is held by worldly renown
\ To be an appropriator in dependence upon the aggregates –
\ The elements, and likewise the six sources.
\ The appropriated are the object, and it is the agent.
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L9: [PERSON-2.1.6.4 Showing other good qualities of asserting a self that is dependently imputed]
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\ [VI.163]
\ #206.
\ Because the thing does not exist, it is not stable and not unstable,
\ It is not born and does not perish,
\ It also has no permanence and so forth,
\ And it is without oneness or otherness.
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L9: [PERSON-2.1.6.5 Recognizing the self that is the basis both of the bondage of delusion and of liberation]
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Madhyamika-Prasangikas
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\ [VI.164]
\ #207.
\ The self with respect to whom a mind grasping at I
\ Always arises strongly in living beings,
\ And with respect to whose possessions a mind grasping at mine arises,
\ That self exists uninvestigated and well-known to confusion.
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L8: [PERSON-2.2 NO MINE – Negating inherently existent mine]
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\ [VI.165]
\ #208.
\ Since without an agent there is no [object of the] action,
\ Without a self there is no mine.
\ Therefore Yogis who see that self and mine are empty
\ Will attain liberation.
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L7: [PERSON-3 ALL DHARMAS – The analysis of the self and the cart also applies to other things]
L8: [PERSON-3.1 THINGS – Applying it to things such as pots and woolen cloth]
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\ [VI.166]
\ #209.
\ Such things as pots, woolen cloth, canvas, armies, forests, rosaries, trees,
\ Houses, small carts, guest houses, and so forth
\ Should be realized in just the same way as they are spoken of;
\ Because the Able One would never argue with the worldly.
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\ [VI.167]
\ #210.
\ Parts and part-possessors, qualities and quality-possessors, attachment and the attached,
\ Characteristics and bases of characteristics, firewood and fire, and so forth-
\ Objects such as these do not exist in seven ways when analyzed like a cart;
\ But otherwise do exist by way of worldly renown.
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L8: [PERSON-3.2 CAUSALITY – Applying it to cause and effect L8: [they cannot be simultaneous, not separated in time; not different, not the same; no causality, no non-causality]
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Madhyamika-Prasangikas
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\ [VI.168]
\ #211.
\ If a cause produces a product it is a cause,
\ And if no effect is produced then, lacking that, it is not a cause;
\ But if an effect has a cause it is produced.
\ Therefore tell us what arises from what, and what precedes what?
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\ [VI.169]
\ #212.
\ If you say that a cause produces an effect through meeting,
\ Then if they are the same potential, producer and effect are not different;
\ And if they are different there is no distinction between cause and non-cause.
\ Having rejected these two, there is no other possibility.
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\ [VI.170ab]
\ #213ab.
\ If you say that causes do not produce effects, then so-called effects do not exist;
\ And without an effect there is no reason for a cause, and they do not exist.
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Madhyamika-Prasangikas
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\ [VI.170cd]
\ #213cd.
\ Since both of these are just like illusions, we are not at fault;
\ And worldly people’s things exist.
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L8: [PERSON-3.3 Rejecting an argument against this]
L9: [PERSON-3.3.1 The arguments that the refutation of inherently existent cause and effect has similar faults]
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Proponents of things
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\ [VI.171]
\ #214.
\ ‘Do these faults not apply to you as well,
\ For your refutation would refute what is to be
\ refuted either by meeting it or by not meeting it?
\ When you say this you destroy only your own position;
\ Thus you are not able to refute what you seek to refute.
.
\ [VI.172]
\ #215.
\ And because without any reason you cast aspersions on everything
\ With false consequences that even in your own words turn back on yourselves,
\ You will not be accepted by the Holy Ones;
\ For, because you have no position of your own, you can only dispute by refuting.’
.
L9: [PERSON-3.3.2 Replying that it does not have similar faults]
L9: [PERSON-3.3.2.1 How refutation and proof are accepted within our position]
L9: [PERSON-3.3.2.1-i How refutation of others’ position is accepted nominally]
.
Madhyamika-Prasangikas
.
\ [VI.173]
\ #216.
\ The fault that you have stated here, that a refutation refutes what is to be refuted
\ Either by meeting or by not meeting,
\ Definitely applies to those who hold the position;
\ But since we do not hold that position, the consequence does not follow.
.
L9: [PERSON-3.3.2.1-ii How proofs within our own position are accepted]
.
Madhyamika-Prasangikas
.
\ [VI.174]
\ #217.
\ Just as for you at the time of an eclipse and so forth
\ The characteristics of the orb of the sun are seen even in a reflection,
\ And although the meeting or non-meeting of the sun and the reflection are certainly inappropriate,
\ Nevertheless it arises dependently and merely nominally.
.
\ [VI.175]
\ #218.
\ And although it is untrue, it is used to beautify the face.
\ Just as that exists, so too in the same way here,
\ Our reasons are seen to be effective in cleaning the wisdom face;
\ For although they are not suited, you should know that with them you can realize the object to be established.
.
L9: [PERSON-3.3.2.2 An explanation clarifying the reason why the others’ consequence is not similar]
.
Madhyamika-Prasangikas
.
\ [VI.176]
\ #219.
\ If the reasons that cause the objects they establish to be understood existed as things,
\ And if the object established, that which is actually understood, were an existent entity,
\ You could apply the reasoning of meeting and so forth;
\ But since they do not exist, you can only despair.
.
L9: [PERSON-3.3.2.3 Lack of inherent existence can be established but others cannot establish its opposite in the same way]
.
Madhyamika-Prasangikas
.
\ [VI.177]
\ #220.
\ We can very easily induce the realization
\ That all things lack things,
\ But you cannot easily make others understand inherent existence in the same way;
\ So why confound the world with a net of bad views?
.
L9: [PERSON-3.3.2.4 How to understand the remaining refutations not explained here]
.
Madhyamika-Prasangikas
.
\ [VI.178]
\ #221.
\ Having understood the last refutation just taught,
\ You should use it here to answer the position of meeting and so forth.
\ We are not like disputants who only refute.
\ Any remainder from what has been explained should be understood by this position.
.
L6: [2.3.5.4 AN EXPLANATION OF THE DIVISIONS OF EMPTINESS – with a commentary from Rinpoche]
L7: [A. The division of emptiness in brief]
.
\ [VI.179]
\ #222.
\ To liberate living beings, the Blessed One said
\ That this selflessness has two types when divided by way of persons and phenomena;
\ And then again, according to disciples,
\ He explained many divisions of these.
.
\ [VI.180]
\ #223.
\ Having extensively explained
\ Sixteen emptinesses,
\ He again explained four in brief;
\ And these are regarded as the Mahayana.
.
L7: [B. An extensive explanation of the meaning of each division]
L7: [B.1 An extensive explanation of the division of emptiness into sixteen]
L8: [1. Emptiness of the inner]
.
\ <<< Since it has no inherent nature,
\ The eye is empty of being an eye.
\ The ear, nose, tongue, body, and mind are the same way.
\ They are all described in a similar way.
\ (Chap. 6., v. 181)
.
\ They are not stable nor forever lasting,
\ Nor do they remain for a short time and decay.
\ The eye and the rest that are the six inner ones
\ Are things that have no essential nature at all.
\ This is what is meant by “emptiness of the inner.” (182) >>>
.
\ [VI.181]
\ #224.
\ Eyes are empty of eyes
\ Because that is their nature.
\ Ears, nose, tongue, body, and mind
\ Should be understood in the same way.
.
\ [VI.182]
\ #225.
\ Because they do not remain constant
\ And do not disintegrate,
\ The lack of inherent existence
\ Of the six, eyes and so forth,
\ Is said to be the emptiness of the inner (1).
.
L8: [2. Emptiness of the outer]
.
\ <<< For these reasons, form’s nature is emptiness;
\ Therefore form is empty of being form.
\ Sounds, odors, things that are tasted, and what the body feels too,
\ All these phenomena are exactly the same. (183)
.
\ Form and so forth have no essential nature:
\ This very lack of essence is called “emptiness of the outer.” (184) >>>
.
\ [VI.183]
\ #226.
\ Forms are empty of forms
\ Because that is their nature.
\ Sounds, smells, tastes, tactile objects, and phenomena
\ Are just the same.
.
\ [VI.184]
\ #227b.
\ The lack of inherent existence of forms and so forth
\ Is said to be the emptiness of the outer (2).
.
L8: [3. Emptiness of the inner and the outer]
.
\ <<< That both inner and outer lack an essential nature
\ Is what is called “emptiness of the inner and the outer.” (184) >>>
.
\ [VI.184]
\ #227cd.
\ The lack of inherent existence of both
\ Is the emptiness of the inner and outer (3).
.
\ [VI.185ab]
\ #228ab.
\ The lack of inherent existence of phenomena
\ Is explained as emptiness by the wise.
.
L8: [4. Emptiness of emptiness]
.
\ <<< All phenomena lack the essential nature, and
\ The wisest of all call this “emptiness.”
\ Furthermore, the Wise One said,
\ This emptiness is empty of being an inherently existent emptiness. (185)
.
\ The emptiness of what is called “emptiness”
\ Is the “emptiness of emptiness.”
\ The Buddha taught it to counteract
\ The mind’s tendency to think of emptiness as something truly existent. (186) >>>
.
\ [VI.185cd]
\ #228cd
\ And that emptiness too is said to be
\ Empty of the entity of emptiness.
.
\ [VI.186]
\ #229.
\ The emptiness of what is called emptiness
\ Is said to be the emptiness of emptiness (4).
\ It was taught to overcome the mind
\ That apprehends emptiness as a thing.
.
L8: [5. Emptiness of the great]
.
\ <<< The “great” is what the ten directions encompass:
\ All sentient beings and the entire universe.
\ The “immeasurables” prove the directions’ infiniteness:
\ They pervade the limitless directions, so they cannot be measured in extent. (187)
.
\ That all ten directions in their whole vast extent
\ Are empty of essence is the “emptiness of the great.”
\ The Buddha taught about its emptiness
\ To reverse our conception of the vast as being real. (188) >>>
.
\ [VI.187]
\ #230.
\ Because they pervade all environments
\ And their beings,
\ And because they are without end like the immeasurables,
\ The directions are great.
.
\ [VI.188]
\ #231.
\ That which is the emptiness
\ Of all these ten directions
\ Is the emptiness of the great (5).
\ It was taught to overcome grasping at the great.
.
L8: [6. Emptiness of the ultimate]
.
\ <<< Because it is wanderer’s supreme of all needs,
\ Nirvana’s cessation is the ultimate here.
\ Nirvana, the Truth Body, is empty of itself,
\ And this is what the emptiness of the ultimate is. (189)
\ The Knower of the Ultimate
\ Taught the “emptiness of the ultimate”
\ To counteract the mind’s tendency
\ To think that nirvana is a thing. (190) >>>
.
\ [VI.189]
\ #232.
\ Because it is the supreme purpose,
\ The ultimate is nirvana.
\ That which is its emptiness
\ Is the emptiness of the ultimate (6).
.
\ [VI.190]
\ #233.
\ The Knower of the ultimate
\ Taught the emptiness of the ultimate
\ To overcome the mind
\ That apprehends nirvana as a thing.
.
L8: [7. Emptiness of the composite]
.
\ <<< Because they arise from conditions
\ The three realms are “composite,” it is taught.
\ They are empty of themselves,
\ And this, the Buddha taught, is the “emptiness of the composite.” (191) >>>
.
\ [VI.191]
\ #234.
\ Because they arise from conditions,
\ The three realms are definitely explained as produced.
\ That which is their emptiness
\ Is said to be the emptiness of the produced (7).
.
L8: [8. Emptiness of the uncomposite]
.
\ <<< When arising, cessation, and impermanence are not among its characteristics,
\ A phenomenon is known as being “uncomposite.”
\ They are empty of themselves.
\ This is the “emptiness of the uncomposite.” (192) >>>
.
\ [VI.192]
\ #235.
\ Whatever lacks production, abiding, and impermanence
\ Is unproduced.
\ That which is its emptiness
\ Is the emptiness of the unproduced (8).
.
L8: [9. Emptiness of that which is beyond extremes]
.
\ <<< That to which extremes do not apply
\ Is expressed as being beyond extremes.
\ Its emptiness of its very self
\ Is explained as the “emptiness of that which is beyond extremes.” (193) >>>
.
\ [VI.193]
\ #236.
\ Whatever is without extremes
\ Is described as beyond extremes.
\ The mere emptiness of that
\ Is explained as the emptiness of beyond extremes (9).
.
L8: [10. Emptiness of that which has neither beginning nor end]
.
\ <<< That which has no point from which it begins
\ Nor boundary where it ends is the cycle of existence.
\ Since it is free from coming and going,
\ It is just mere appearance, like a dream. (194) >>>
.
\ Existence is void of any existence:
\ This is the emptiness of
\ That which neither begins nor ends.
\ It was definitively taught in the commentaries. (195) >>>
.
\ [VI.194]
\ #237.
\ Because samsara lacks both
\ A first beginning and a final end,
\ It is described as beginningless and endless.
\ Because it is free from coming and going, it is like a dream.
.
\ [VI.195]
\ #238.
\ In the scriptures it clearly says that
\ That which is the isolation of this samsara
\ Is called the emptiness
\ Of the beginningless and endless (10).
.
L8: [11. Emptiness of what should not be discarded]
.
\ <<< To “discard” something means
\ To throw it away or to abandon it.
\ What should not be discarded is
\ What one should never cast away from oneself “the great vehicle”. (196)
\ What should not be discarded
\ Is empty of itself.
\ Since this emptiness is its very nature,
\ It is spoken of as the “emptiness of what should not be discarded.” (197) >>>
.
\ [VI.196]
\ #239.
\ Rejected is clearly explained as
\ Cast aside or forsaken.
\ Not rejected, or not given up,
\ Is that which should not be rejected at any time.
.
\ [VI.197]
\ #240.
\ That which is the emptiness
\ Of the not rejected
\ Is therefore called
\ The emptiness of the not rejected (11).
.
L8: [12. Emptiness of the true nature]
.
\ <<< The true essence of composite and all other phenomena is pure being,
\ Therefore, neither the students, the solitary realizers,
\ The bodhisattvas, nor the Buddhas
\ Created this essence anew. (198)
\ Therefore, this essence of the composite and so forth
\ Is said to be the very nature of phenomena.
\ It itself is empty of itself.
\ This is the emptiness of the true nature. (199) >>>
.
\ [VI.198]
\ #241.
\ Because the very entity
\ Of the produced and so forth
\ Was not made by Hearers, Solitary Realizers,
\ Conquerors’ Sons, or Tathagatas,
.
\ [VI.199]
\ #242.
\ So the very entity of the produced and so forth
\ Is explained as their very nature.
\ That which is the emptiness of that
\ Is the emptiness of nature (12).
.
L8: [13. Emptiness of all phenomena]
.
\ <<< The eighteen potentials, the six types of contact,
\ And from those six, the six types of feeling,
\ Furthermore, all that is form and all that is not,
\ The composite and the uncomposite “this comprises all phenomena”. (200)
\ All of these phenomena are free of being themselves.
\ This emptiness is the “emptiness of all phenomena.” (201) >>>
.
\ [VI.200]
\ #243.
\ The eighteen elements, the six contacts,
\ The six feelings that arise from them,
\ Likewise those possessing form and those not possessing form,
\ And produced and unproduced phenomena;
.
\ [VI.201ab]
\ #244ab.
\ That which is the isolation of all of these
\ Is the emptiness of all phenomena (13).