“Fundamental of the Middle Way” & “Averting the Arguments” (MulamadhyamakaKarikas & Vigrahavyavartani) by Nagarjuna – Part 2

[CHAPTER 9 – An Analysis of “the Pre-existent Reality” (purva) (grasper and grasping) – 12 verses – No permanent owner of the six senses, perceiver before perception]
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#1.
Certain people say: Prior to seeing hearing, and other [sensory faculties] together with sensation and other [mental phenomena]
Is that to which they belong.
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#2.
[They reason:] How will there be seeing, etc. of someone (i.e. as the subject seeing) who does not exist?
Therefore, there exists a definite (vyavasthita) entity before that [seeing, etc.].
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#3.
But that definite entity is previous to sight, hearing, etc., and sensation, etc —
How can that [entity] be known?
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#4.
And if that [entity] is determined without sight [and other sensory faculties],
Then, undoubtedly, those [sensory faculties] will exist without that [entity].
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#5.
Someone becomes manifest by something (i.e. like vision); something is manifest by someone.
How would someone exist without something? How would something exist without someone?
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#6.
[The opponent admits:]
Someone does not exist previous to (purva) sight and all the other [faculties] together.
[Rather,] he is manifested by any one of [them:] sight, etc., at any one time.
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#7.
[Nagarjuna answers:]
But if nothing exists previous to sight and all the other [faculties] together,
How could that [being] exist individually before sight, etc.?
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#8.
[Further,] if that [being] were the “seer,” that [being] were the “hearer,” that [being] were the one who senses,
Then one [being] would exist previous to each. Therefore, this [hypothesis] is not logically justified.
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#9.
On the other hand, if the “seer” were someone else, or the “hearer” were someone else, or the one who senses were someone else,
Then there would be a “hearers when there was already a “seer,” and that would mean a multiplicity of “selves” (atma).
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#11.
When he to whom seeing, hearing, etc., and feeling, etc. belong does not exist,
Then certainly they do not exist.
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#12.
For him who does not exist previous to, at the same time, or after seeing, etc.
The conception “He exists,” “He does not exist,” is dissipated.
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[CHAPTER 10 – An Analysis of Fire and Kindling (fire and fuel) – 16 verses – Non-duality of self & the five aggregates of clinging; non-duality of dependent origination and emptiness]
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#1.
If fire is identical to its kindling, then it is both producer and product.
And if fire is different from kindling, then surely [fire] exists without kindling (i.e. separate).
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#2.
A [fire] which is perpetually burning would exist without a cause, which is kindling,
Since another beginning would be pointless; in this case [fire] is without its object [i.e., burning of kindling].
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#3.
[Fire] is without a cause, namely kindling, if it were independent of anything else;
In which case another beginning would be pointless, and there is perpetual burning.
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#4.
If it is maintained: Kindling is that which is being kindled,
By what is kindling kindled, since kindling is only that [kindling]?
It is inherent existence that would make extinguishing / liberation impossible
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#5.
[Fire], when different and not obtained [through kindling], will not obtain; not burning, it will not burn later;
Without extinction, it will not be extinguished; if there is no extinction, then it will remain with its own characteristics.
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#6.
[The opponent claims:]
If fire is different from kindling it could obtain the kindling
As a woman obtains a husband, and a man [obtains] a wife.
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#7.
[Nagarjuna answers:]
Though fire is different from kindling, it could indeed obtain the kindling,
On the condition that both fire and kindling can be reciprocally differentiated [—but, this is impossible].
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#8.
If the fire is dependent on the kindling, and if the kindling is dependent on the fire
Which is attained first, dependent on which they are fire and kindling?
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#9.
If fire is dependent on kindling, so is the proof of the proved fire.
Thus, being kindling it will exist without fire.
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#10.
When a thing (bhava) is proved by being dependent on something else, then it proves the other by being dependent [on it].
If that which is required for dependence must be proved, then what is dependent on what?
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#11.
If that thing is proved by being dependent, how can that which has not been proved be dependent?
So, that which is proved is dependent; but the dependence is not possible.
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#12.
Fire does not exist in relation to kindling; and fire does not exist unrelated to kindling.
Kindling does not exist in relation to fire; and kindling does not exist unrelated to fire.
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#13.
Fire does not come from something else;
and fire does not exist in kindling.
The remaining [analysis] in regard to kindling is described by [the analysis of] “that which is being gone to,” “that which is gone to” and ”that which is not yet gone to.”
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#14.
Fire is not identical to kindling, but fire is not in anything other than kindling.
Fire does not have kindling as its property; also, the kindling is not in fire and vice versa.
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#15.
By [the analysis of] fire and kindling the syllogism of the individual self (atma) and “the acquiring” (upadana)
Is fully and completely explained, as well as “the jar” and “the cloth” and other [analogies].
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#16.
Those who specify the nature of the individual self and of existing things (bhava) as radically different—
Those people I do not regard as ones who know the sense of the teaching.
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[CHAPTER 11 – An Analysis of the Past (purva) and Future Limits (aparakiti) –of Existence] (samsara) – 8 verses – Explaining samsara and “no-self” without using any inherent dharma.]
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#1.
The great ascetic [Buddha] said: “The extreme limit (koti) of the past cannot be discerned.”
“Existence-in-flux” (samsara) is without bounds; indeed, there is no beginning nor ending of that [existence].
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#2.
How could there be a middle portion of that which has no “before” and “after”;
It follows that “past,” “future,” and “simultaneous events” do not obtain.
Birth and death are not separate / different, not simultaneous / the same.
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#3.
If birth [is regarded as] the former, and growing old and dying [are regarded as] coming into being later,
Then birth exists without growing old and dying, and [something] is born without death.
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#4.
If birth were later, and growing old and dying were earlier,
How would there be an uncaused growing old and dying of something unborn?
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#5.
And a birth which is simultaneous with growing old and dying is likewise impossible;
For, that which is being born would die, and both would be without cause.
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#6.
Since the past, future, and simultaneous activity do not originate,
To what purpose [do you] explain in detail [the existence of] birth, growing old and dying?
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#7.
That which is produced and its cause, as well as the characteristic and that which is characterized,
The sensation and the one who senses, and whatever other things there are —
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#8.
Not only is the former limit of existence-in-flux (samsara) not to be found,
But the former limit of all those things is not to be found.
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[CHAPTER 12 – An Analysis of Sorrow (dukkha) (suffering) – 10 verses – Dukkha cannot be caused by a personality, internal, external, both or neither]
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#1.
Some say:
Sorrow (dukkha) is produced by oneself (i),
or by another (ii),
or by both [itself and another] (iii),
or from no cause at all (iv);
But [to consider] that [sorrow (dukkha)] as what is produced is not possible.
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#2.
If it were produced by itself (i.e. self-causation), it would not exist dependent on something else.
Certainly those “groups of universal elements” (skandhas) exist presupposing these “groups.”
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#3.
If these were different from those, or if those were different from these,
Sorrow (dukkha) would be produced by something other than itself (i.e. other-causation), because those would be made by these others.
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#4.
If sorrow (dukkha) is made through one’s own personality (i) (svapudgala), then one’s own personality would be without sorrow (dukkha);
Who is that “own personality” by which sorrow (dukkha) is self-produced (i)?
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#5.
If sorrow (dukkha) were produced by a different personality (ii) (parapudgala),
How would he, to whom is given that sorrow (dukkha) by another after he had produced it, be without sorrow (dukkha)?
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#6.
If sorrow (dukkha) is produced by a different personality, who is that different personality
Who, while being without sorrow (dukkha), yet makes and transmits that [sorrow (dukkha)] to the other?
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#7.
It is not established that sorrow (dukkha) is self-produced (i), [but] how is [sorrow (dukkha)] produced by another (ii)?
Certainly the sorrow (dukkha), which would be produced by another (ii), in his case would be self-produced (i’).
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#8.
Sorrow (dukkha) is not self-produced (i), for that which is produced is certainly not produced by that [personality].
If the “other” (para) is not produced by the individual self (atma), how would sorrow (dukkha) be that produced by another?
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#9.
Sorrow (dukkha) could be made by both [self and the “other”] (iii) if it could be produced by either one.
[But] not produced by another, and not self-produced (iv) —how can sorrow (dukkha) exist without a caused
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#10.
Not only are the four [causal] interpretations not possible in respect to sorrow (dukkha),
[but also] none of the four [causal] interpretations is possible even in respect to external things (bhava).
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[CHAPTER 13 – An Analysis of Conditioned Elements (samskara) (the real) – 8 verses – Dukkha is not due to things that exist and are impermanent]
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#1.
A thing of which the basic elements are deception is vain, as the glorious one said.
All conditioned elements (samskara) are things that have basic elements (dharma) which are deception; therefore, they are vain.
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#2.
“If that which has deceptive basic elements is vain, what is there which deceives?”
This was spoken by the glorious one to illuminate “emptiness.”
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#3.
[An opponent says:]
There is non-self-existence of things [since] a thing, by observation, [becomes] something else. (i.e. impermanence)
A thing without self-existence does not exist—due to the emptiness of existing things.
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#4.
If self-existence does not exist, whose “other-existence” would there be?
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[Nagarjuna answers:]
If self-existence does exist, whose “other-existence” would there be?
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#5.
Just as there is no other-existence of a thing, so also [an-other-existence] of something else is not possible—
Since a youth is not aging (jiryate), and since “who has already aged” is not aging (jiryate).
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#6.
If there would be an other-existence of a thing, milk would exist as curds.
[But] surely “being curds” will be something other than milk.
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#7.
If something would be non-empty, something would [logically also] be empty
But nothing is non-empty, so how will it become empty?
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#8.
Emptiness is proclaimed by the victorious one as the refutation of all viewpoints;
But those who hold “emptiness” as a viewpoint—[the true perceivers] have called those “incurable” (asadhya).
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[CHAPTER 14 – An Analysis of Unification (samsarga) (combination) – 8 verses – The inseparability of the three realms; or of body, speech and mind]
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#1.
That which is seen, sight, and the “seer”: these three
Do not combine together either in pairs or altogether.
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#2.
Desire, the one who desires, and the object of desire have to be regarded in the same way,
[As also] the impurities which remain and the three kinds of “base of sense” (ayatana) which remain.
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#3.
[Some hold:] There is unification (samsarga) of one different thing with another different thing; [but] since the differentness
Of what is seen, etc. does not exist, those [factors] do not enter into unification.
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#4.
Not only does the differentness of that which is seen, etc. not exist,
Also the differentness of something coming from another does not obtain.
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#5.
A thing is different insofar as it presupposes a second different thing.
One thing is not different from another thing without the other thing.
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#6.
If one different thing is different from a second different thing, it exists without a second different thing;
But without a second different thing, one different thing does not exist as a different thing.
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#7.
Differentness does not exist in a different thing, nor in what is not different.
When differentness does not exist, then there is neither what is different nor “this” [from which something can be different].
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#8.
Unification is not possible by [uniting] one thing with that one thing, nor by [uniting] one thing with a different thing;
Thus, the becoming unified, the state of being united, and the one who unites are not possible.
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[CHAPTER 15 – An Analysis of a Self-existent Thing (svabhava) (being and non-being) – 11 verses – The provisional and definitive teachings; a changing thing or being is not the same, nor different]
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#1.
The production of a self-existent thing by a conditioning cause is not possible,
[For,] being produced through dependence on a cause, a self-existent thing would be “something which is produced” (krtaka).
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#2.
How, indeed, will a self-existent thing become “something which is produced”?
Certainly, a self-existent thing [by definition] is “not-produced” and is independent of anything else.
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#3.
If there is an absence of a self-existent thing, how will an other-existent thing (parabhava) come into being?
Certainly the self-existence of an other-existent thing is called ”other-existence.”
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#4.
Further, how can a thing [exist] without either self-existence or other-existence?
If either self-existence or other existence exist, then an existing thing, indeed, would be proved.
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#5.
If there is no proof of an existent thing, then a non-existent thing cannot be proved.
Since people call the other-existence of an existent thing a “non-existent thing.”
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#6.
Those who perceive self-existence and other-existence, and an existent thing and a non-existent thing,
Do not perceive the true nature of the Buddha’s teaching.
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#7.
In “The Instruction of Katyayana” both “it is” and “it is not” are opposed
By the Glorious One, who has ascertained the meaning of “existent” and non-existent.”
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#8.
If there would be an existent thing by its own nature, there could not be “non-existence’ of that [thing].
Certainly an existent thing different from its own nature would never obtain.
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# 9.
[An opponent asks:]
If there is no basic self-nature (prakti), of what will there be “otherness”?
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[Nagarjuna answers:]
If there is basic self-nature, of what will there be “otherness”?
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#10.
“It is” is a notion of eternity. “It is not” is a nihilistic view.
Therefore, one who is wise does not have recourse to “being” or “non-being.”
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#11.
That which exists by its own nature is eternal since “it does not not-exist.”
If it is maintained: “That which existed before does not exist now,” there annihilation would logically follow.
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[CHAPTER 16 – An Analysis of Being Bound (bandhana) and Release (moksa) (bondage and release) – 10 verses – No personal rebirths or Liberation]
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#1.
When conditioned elements (dispositions, conditioning?) continue to change (through rebirths?), they do not continue to change as eternal things (the same before and after).
Likewise they do not continue to change as non-eternal things (different before and after).
The arguments here is the same as for a living being.
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#2.
If the personality would change when it is sought five ways in the “groups” (skandha), “bases of sense perception” (ayatana), and the “irreducible elements” (dhatu),
Then it does not exist. Who [is it who] will change (i.e. transmigrate)?
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#3.
Moving from “acquisition” (upadana) to “acquisition” would be “that which is without existence” (vibhava).
Who is he who is without existence and without acquisition? To what will he change (i.e. transmigrate)?
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#4.
The final cessation (nirvana) of the conditioned elements certainly is not possible at all.
Nor is the final cessation of even a living being possible at all.
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#5.
The conditioned elements, whose nature (dharma) is arising and destruction, neither are bound nor released.
Likewise a living being neither is bound nor released.
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#6.
If the acquisition (upadana) were the “binding,” that one [having] the acquisition is not bound;
Nor is that one not having the acquisition bound.
Then in what condition is he bound?
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#7.
Certainly if the “binding” would exist before “that which is bound,” then it must bind;
But that does not exist. The remaining [analysis] is stated in [the analysis of] “the present going to,” “that which has already gone to” and “that which has not yet gone to.”
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#8.
Therefore, “that which is bound” is not released and “that which is not bound” is likewise not released.
If “that which is bound” were released, “being bound” and “release” would exist simultaneously.
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#9.
“I will be released without any acquisition.”
“Nirvana will be mine.”
Those who understand thus hold too much to “a holding on” [i.e., both to the acquisition of karma, and to a viewpoint].
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#10.
Where there is a super-imposing of nirvana [on something else], nor a removal of existence-in-flux,
What is the existence-in-flux there?
What nirvana is imagined?
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[CHAPTER 17 – An Analysis of Action (karma) and Its Product (phala) (action and its results) – 33 verses – The whole chain of karma formation and its fruits is empty, like a magic trick]
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#1.
The state of mind which is self-disciplined, being favorably disposed toward others,
And friendship: that is the dharma; that is the seed for the fruit now and after death.
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#2.
The most perceptive seer [Buddha] has said that there is action (karma) as volition and as a result of having willed.
The variety of acts of that [action] has been explained in many ways.
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#3.
Thus, that action which is called “volition”: that is considered [by tradition] as mental;
But that action which is a result of having willed: that is considered [by tradition] as physical or verbal.
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#4.
Sound (1), gesture (2) and that which does not rest which is considered as unknown (3),
Also the other unknown which is considered to be at rest (4);
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#5.
That which is pure as a result of enjoyment (5), that which is impure as a result of enjoyment (6),
And volition (7): these seven basic elements (dharma) are considered [by the tradition] as the modes of action.
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#6.
If an action [exists] by enduring to the time of its fulfillment, that [action] would be eternal.
If [an action] were stopped—being stopped, what will it produce?
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#7.
There is fruit (phala) when a process, a sprout, etc., starts from a seed;
But without a seed that [process] does not proceed.
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#8.
Inasmuch as the process is dependent on a seed and the fruit is produced from the process,
The fruit, presupposing the seed, neither comes to an end nor is eternal.
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#9.
There is a product (phala) when a mental process starts from a thoughts;
But without a thought that [process] does not proceed.
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#10.
Inasmuch as the process is dependent on a thought and the product (phala) is produced from the process,
The product, presupposing the thought, neither comes to an end nor is eternal.
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#11.
The ten pure “paths of action” are means for realizing the dharma.
And the five qualities of desired objects [i.e., desire to know the form, sound, odor, taste, and touch of existence] are fruits (phala) of the dharma both now and after death.
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#12.
There would be many great mistakes if that explanation [were accepted].
Therefore, that explanation is not possible.
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#13.
In rebuttal I will explain the interpretation which can be made to fit [the facts],
That which is followed by the Buddha, the self-sufficient enlightened ones (pratyekabuddha) and the disciples [of Buddha].
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#14.
As “that which is imperishable” is like a credit [on an account statement], so an action (karma) is like a debt.
[The imperishable is] of four kinds in its elements (dhatu) [i.e., desire, form, non-form, and pure]; in its essential nature it cannot be analyzed.
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#15.
[An imperishable force] is not destroyed qua destruction; rather it is destroyed according to spiritual discipline.
Therefore, the fruit of actions originates by the imperishable force.
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#16.
If [the imperishable force] were that which is destroyed by [usual] destruction or by transference of action,
Fallacies [like] the destruction of action would logically result.
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#17.
At the moment of transition that [imperishable force]
Of all identical and different actions belonging to the same element (dhatu) originates.
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#18.
That [imperishable force] is the dharma, having arisen by one action after another in visible existence;
And it remains [constant] even in the development of all bifurcating action.
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#19.
That [imperishable force] is destroyed by death and by avoiding the product (phala) .
There the difference is characterized as impure and pure.
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#20.
“Emptiness,” “no annihilation,” existence-in-flux, “non-eternity,”
And the imperishable reality of action: such was the teaching taught by the Buddha.
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[Nagarjuna refutes the above arguments:]
21.
Why does the action not originate?
Because it is without self-existence.
Since it does not originate, it does not perish.
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#22.
If an action did exist as a self-existent thing, without a doubt, it would be eternal.
An action would be an unproduced thing; certainly, there is no eternal thing which is produced.
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#23.
If the action were not produced, then there could be the fear attaining something from “something not produced”;
Then the opposite to a saintly discipline would follow as a fallacy.
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#24.
Then, undoubtedly, all daily affairs would be precluded.
And even the distinction between saints and sinners is not possible.
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#25.
Then an act whose development had taken place would develop again,
If an act, because it persists, exists through its own nature.
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#26.
An action is that whose “self” (atman) is desire, and the desires do not really exist.
If these desires do not really exist, how would the action really exist?
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#27.
Action and desire are declared to be the conditioning cause of the body.
If action and desire are empty, what need one say about “body”?
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#28.
[An opponent tries to establish an identifiable entity by saying:]
The man shrouded in ignorance, and chained by craving (trsna)
Is one who seeks enjoyment. He is not different from the one who acts, nor identical to it.
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#29.
[Nagarjuna answers:]
Since action is not “originated presupposing the conditions” nor fails to arise from presupposing the conditions,
There is no one acting.
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#30.
If there is no action, how could there be one who acts and the product of action?
And if there is no product, how can there be an enjoyer of the product?
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#31.
Just as a teacher, by his magical power, formed a magical form,
And this magical form formed again another magical form—
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#32.
Just so the “one who forms” is himself being formed magically; and the act performed by him
Is like a magical form being magically formed by another magical form.
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#33.
Desires, actions, bodies, producers, and products
Are like a fairy castle, resembling a mirage, a dream.
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[CHAPTER 18 – An Analysis of the Individual Self (atma) (the self and phenomena) – 12 verses – Nirvana is realizing the non-dual nature of the self and everything, beyond causality, production, conceptualization, or the four extremes]
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#1.
If the individual self (atma) were [identical to] the “groups” (skandha), then it would partake of origination and destruction.
If [the individual self] were different from the “groups,” then it would be without the characteristics of the “groups.”
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#2.
If the individual self does not exist, how then will there be something which is “my own”?
There is lack of possessiveness and no ego on account of the cessation of self and that which is “my own.”
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#3.
He who is without possessiveness and who has no ego — He, also, does not exist.
Whoever sees “he who is without possessiveness” or “he who has no ego” [really] does not see.
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#4.
When “I” and “mine” have stopped, then also there is not an outside nor an inner self.
The “acquiring” [of karma] (upadana) is stopped; on account of that destruction, there is destruction of verse existence.
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#5.
On account of the destruction of the pains (klesa) of action there is release for pains of action exist for him who constructs them.
These pains result from phenomenal extension (prapanca); but this phenomenal extension comes to a stop by emptiness.
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#7.
When the domain of thought has been dissipated, “that which can be stated” is dissipated.
Those things which are unoriginated and not terminated, like nirvana, constitute the Truth (dharmata).
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#8.
Everything is “actual” (tathyam) or “not-actual,” or both “acts actual-and-not-actual,”
Or “neither-actual-nor-not-actual”:
This is the teaching of the Buddha.
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#9.
“Not caused by something else,” “peaceful,” “not elaborated by discursive thought,”
“Indeterminate,” “undifferentiated”: such are the characteristics of true reality (tattva).
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#10.
Whatever exists, being dependent [on something else], is certainly not identical to that [other thing],
Nor is a thing different from that; therefore, it is neither destroyed nor eternal.
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#11.
The immortal essence of the teaching of the Buddhas, the lords of the world, is
Without singleness or multiplicity; it is not destroyed nor is it eternal.
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#12.
If fully-developed Buddhas do not arise [in the world] and the disciples [of the Buddha] disappear,
Then, independently, the knowledge of the self-produced enlightened ones (pratyekabuddha) is produced.
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